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African Conflicts: 
Background Factors, Motives and Patterns 
 
 
Bjørn Møller* 
 
This paper is devoted to some of the potential causes and general features of 
African conflicts, focusing on the background factors. It commences with 
assessing the legacy of colonialism with which the newly independent states in 
Africa were bequeathed, both economically and politically, followed by a brief 
survey of the implications of the bipolar system into which they were “born” as 
well as the consequences of its disappearance around 1990. This is followed by 
an analysis of the economic and political “pathologies” of African countries as 
well as “the African security predicament”. It concludes with analyses of the 
various conflict patterns as well as the motives underlying them.   
 
Decolonisation and the Inheritance 
There are various theories about the causes of decolonisation, largely 
overlapping with the theories about the nature of colonialism and imperialism. 
 
Causes and Dynamics of Decolonisation 
Some analysts focus on the cyclical pattern of empire from ascendancy via over-
extension to decline, a structural mode of explanation which basically depicts 
decolonisation as inevitable, and which may even provide some clues as to the 
timing.1 Others have focused on the proximate causes of decolonisation, 
pointing inter alia to economic factors such as the changing price structures 
created by the great depression of the 1930s, which made colonial production 
less lucrative; to political factors such the rise of a new great power  (the United 
States) which had (almost) no colonies and was therefore inclined to support 
independence; to ideological factors such as the growing acknowledgement of 
human rights and the delegitimisation of all forms of racism after the genocidal 
excesses of Nazi Germany; or to the struggle of the liberation movements in the 
colonies. As all these factors point in the same direction, and as all possess some 
intrinsic plausibility, it is entirely possible that decolonisation was over 
determined.2  In any case, it happed, albeit in stages.  
 
The First World War and the defeat of Germany as well as the Ottoman Empire 
produced a certain reordering of the imperial map, as the vanquished had to 
relinquish their colonies. However, by that time the norm of national self-
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determination had gained some ground, e.g. as formulated by U.S. president 
Wilson in his “fourteen points”3 and as codified (albeit in rather vague and 
ambiguous terms) by the League of Nations.4 Hence, imperialism was no longer 
entirely comme il faut. In article 22 of its covenant the League thus referred to 
colonies as “not yet able to stand by themselves” with the implication that “the 
well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation”. 
Hence the need for “tutelage”, which should be entrusted to “advanced nations”, 
acting on behalf of the League. 
 
As a consequence, the colonies of the vanquished were not simply taken over by 
the victors as colonies, but as “trusts”, and a norm of accountability was 
established, the mandate powers having to provide annual reports on their 
administration to the League. Moreover, the way in which the former colonies 
were classified according to their prospects of independence also established 
certain precedents and certainly a compelling logic, according to which colonies 
could progress towards independence, in due course.5  
 
In Africa the reordering of the colonial map meant that the former German 
colonies Rwanda and Burundi were to be administered by Belgium, Tanganyika 
by the UK and South-West Africa by the UK as well, which chose to 
“outsource” the administration to the de facto (but not de jure) independent 
South Africa. The colonies Togo and Cameroon, in their turn, were divided 
between the UK and France.6 
 
After the Second World War the League’s norm of national self-determination 
was taken over by the United Nation,7 as evidenced by its creation of a 
Trusteeship Council.  Moreover, in 1960 some clarification was achieved as to 
the implications of self-determination when the General Assembly passed 
resolution 1514, known as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Territories and Countries, which effectively removed whatever 
legitimacy colonialism might have retained. 
 
The General Assembly,  
 (...) Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its 
manifestations. Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the 
development of international economic cooperation, impedes the social, cultural and 
economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of 
universal peace.  
(...) Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to 
avoid serious crises, and end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and 
discrimination associated therewith.  
Declares that:  (...)  
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
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development. (...) 
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples 
shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete 
independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. (...) 
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations.    
 
While this declaration certainly provided legitimacy as well as urgency to 
decolonisation, it was not without its intrinsic contradictions. National self-
determination was thus interpreted as applying only to geographically distinct 
territories, but neither to contiguous territories such as the Russian and Soviet 
conquests (sometimes referred to as the “saltwater criterion”)8 nor to parts of 
colonies. General Assembly resolution 1541 (15 December 1960) thus 
mentioned an implicit criterion for prima facie accepting a territory as a colony, 
namely that it should be “geographically separate and (..) distinct ethnically 
and/or culturally from the country administering it” (Art. IV), in which case the 
said territory should be allowed to freely decide whether to form an independent 
state or integrate, or enter into an association, with an already independent state 
(Art. VI). Moreover, it was made clear that national self-determination was a 
right to be exercised only once, and that it did not apply to parts of former 
colonies. 
 
This norm was put to a test with the several cases of attempted secession from 
newly independent African states, such as that of Katanga (from Congo) in 1961 
and of Biafra (from Nigeria) in 1967-1970.9 In both cases the secessionist 
attempt was condemned by virtually the entire international community and 
recognition was denied to the secessionists. The case of Western Sahara (i.e. 
what Africans call Sahrawi) was different, the African countries recognising it 
as an independent state, but the rest of the world withholding recognition.10 The 
case of Eritrea was even more sui generis as this was a former Italian colony 
which had initially (1952) been associated, in the form of a federation, with 
independent Ethiopia (in line with resolution 1541) but subsequently effectively 
annexed (1962), thereby provoking an ultimately (1991) victorious war of 
secession.11 
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Table 1: Decolonisation in Africa12 
Present 
 Name 
Indepen
dence 
 Temporary 
adm. 
Present 
 Name 
Indepen
dence 
Temporary 
adm. 
German Colonies Italian Colonies 
Burundi 1962 Belgium Eritreae 1993 Ethiopia 
Cameroon 1960 UK/France Libya 1951  
Namibia 1990 South Africa Somalia f 1960   
Rwanda 1962 UK/Belgium Belgian Colonies 
Tanzania a 1961/63 UK DR of Congo 1960 n.a. 
Togob 1960 UK/France French Colonies 
British Colonies Algeria 1962 n.a. 
Botswana 1966 n.a. Benin 1960 n.a. 
Egypt 1922 n.a. Burkina Faso 1960 n.a. 
The Gambia 1965 n.a. Central Afr. 
Rep. 
1960 n.a. 
Ghana 1957 n.a. Chad 1960 n.a. 
Kenya 1963 n.a. Comoros 1975 n.a. 
Lesotho 1966 n.a. Congo, Rep. Of 1960 n.a. 
Malawi 1964 n.a. Cote d'Ivoire 1960 n.a. 
Mauritius 1968 n.a. Djibouti 1977 n.a. 
Nigeria 1960 n.a. Gabon 1960 n.a. 
Seychelles 1976 n.a. Guinea 1958 n.a. 
Sierra Leone 1961 n.a. Madagascar 1960 n.a. 
South Africa c 1910/94 n.a. Mali 1960 n.a. 
Swaziland 1968 n.a. Mauritania 1960 n.a. 
Sudand 1956 Egypt Morocco 1956 n.a. 
Uganda 1962 n.a. Niger 1960 n.a. 
Zambia 1964 n.a. Senegal 1960 n.a. 
Zimbabwec 1965/80 n.a. Tunisia 1956 n.a. 
Portuguese Colonies Spanish Colonies 
Angola 1975 n.a. Eq. Guinea 1968 n.a. 
Cape Verde 1975 n.a. Sarawi g n.a. Morocco 
Guinea-Bissau 1974 n.a. Independent throughout 
Mozambique 1975 n.a. Ethiopia h 1941/55 n.a. 
Sao Tome/Pr. 1975 n.a. Liberia 1847 n.a. 
Legend: a) Independence of Tanganyika (former mandate territory) and Zanzibar (former 
colony), respectively; b) French mandate territory, British part ceded to Ghana; c) Independence/ 
transition to majority rule; d) Anglo-Egyptian condominium; e) Federated with Ethiopia in 1952, 
annexed in 1962; f) Merger of Italian and British Somalia; g) The former Spanish West Sahara has 
been recognised by most African countries under the name Sarawi, but not by Morocco; h) 
Formally an Italian colony from 1936 until it was liberated by the UK in 1941, but only formally 
recognised as a state in 1955.   
 
While there were some examples of liberation by force as well as several cases 
where the use of force played a significant role, there is little doubt that the 
major colonial powers would have been able to hold on to their empires 
militarily, had they been determined to do so. Much more significant than the 
actual use of force was the vanishing legitimacy of such military force as would 
have been required to quell the liberation struggles. In most cases independence 
was thus achieved after negotiations between the major liberation movements 
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and the colonial power in question—sometimes preceded by minor disturbances. 
The great wave of decolonisation came around 1960 as summarised in Table 1.  
 
In a few instances, however, independence was achieved through a victorious 
war, leaving (the political wing of) an armed liberation movement in power, as 
was arguably the case of Algeria’s liberation from France.13 In other cases 
liberation was not directly produced by armed struggle, but a violent rebellion 
nevertheless played an important role in making the colonial power reassess the 
pros and cons of empire. This was, for instance, the case of Kenya’s 
independence from the UK, which was preceded by the bloody Mau-Mau 
rebellion, but where the links between the armed insurgents and the subsequent 
rulers, led by Yomo Kenyatta, were less than clear.14 
 
Whereas the major colonial powers thus, for whatever reason, gradually saw the 
writing on the wall and around 1960 became prepared to grant independence 
voluntarily, there were a few instances of belated and enforced decolonisation, 
where the use of violence played a significant, or even decisive, role. 
 
• Portugal stubbornly clung to its five African colonies, i.e. Guinea-Bissau, 
Cape Verde, Saō Tomé and Principe and especially Mozambique and 
Angola, provoking protracted liberation wars.15 While the waging of these 
wars became prohibitively costly (both in financial terms and in terms of 
casualties) for Portugal, it nevertheless required an uprising in the colonial 
metropole to bring about a withdrawal from empire. 
• In the British colony of South Rhodesia peaceful transition to independence 
was pre-empted by a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) on the part 
of the white settler minority under Ian Smith, whence ensued an armed 
struggle lasting until the achievement of independence in 1980.16  
• In South Africa, the era of colonialism arguably only came to an end with the 
peaceful transition to majority rule in 1994. The ANC had created armed 
forces (Umkonto we Sizwe, i.e. “Spear of the Nation”, with the acronym MK) 
and had, as a matter of principle, refused to renounce the use of armed force, 
but it would be hard to argue that this was the decisive factor in bringing 
about the fall of apartheid.17    
• The former German colony Southwest Africa had, as mentioned above, by 
the League of Nations been made a South African mandate territory, initially 
acting on behalf of the UK—a curious instance of  “colonisation by proxy”, 
which rendered decolonisation more problematic. When the mandate was 
subsequently retracted by the UN the apartheid regime simply refused to 
withdraw and maintained its hold on what was in 1990, after a protracted 
armed struggle by SWAPO (South-West African People’s Organisation), to 
become the present Namibia.18 
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• A somewhat similar case was that of Eritrea mentioned above, where 
independence was, likewise, only achieved de facto in 1991 after a protracted 
armed struggle by the EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front)19 and de 
jure two years later. 
• The same was the case with the former British colony of Somaliland which 
was merged with Italian Somalia, but which has subsequently become de 
facto independent following the effective collapse of Somalia around 1992.20  
• A similar case (in some respects) was that of Western Sahara which had been 
administered by newly liberated Morocco after Spain’s withdrawal, 
producing an armed liberation struggle by the POLISARIO (Frente Popular 
para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio Do Oro) and recognition of it 
as the legitimate representatives of “Sahrawi” by all other African states, 
except Morocco.21  
 
The Legacy of Colonialism 
The around three quarters of a century of colonial rule which most of Africa had 
endured inevitably left an indelible imprint, both politically and economically, 
on what around 1960 became independent states.22 
 
Focusing on the political development, Basil Davidson dismissed the era of 
colonialism as a setback for a process of modernisation, which would otherwise 
have been very likely to take place: 
 
In retrospect, the whole great European project in Africa, stretching over more than a hundred 
years, can only seem a vast obstacle thrust across every reasonable avenue of African progress 
out of preliterate and prescientific societies into the “modern world”.23 
 
Whereas pre-colonial Africa had seen a wide variety of political systems, 
featuring city-states, more or less European-style monarchies, loose empires, 
etc., the fact that decolonisation took place at a point in time when the state had 
become the paradigmatic form of political organisation meant that the former 
colonies had few options other than adopting statehood as known from Europe, 
lock, stock and barrel. While the continent, on the very eve of independence, 
experienced a strong current of pan-Africanism, envisaging a unified 
continent,24 these ideologies soon lost out to those of statehood, which were also 
being promoted by the colonial powers and the UN. 
 
With such statehood came borders clearly separating the “inside” from the 
“outside”,25 along with the presumption that the state was sovereign “inside” in 
the Weberian sense of enjoying a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.26 
Moreover, the new states were born into a highly regulated state system,27 where 
not only the norms of statehood as such were well established—codified in, inter 
alia, the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States of 194928—but where 
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they had been supplemented with a panoply of norms about democracy, civil 
liberties and human rights. 
 
The borders between the former colonies automatically became those of the new 
independent states, regardless of the fact that they were often far from 
“rational”. Neither did they always represent “natural boundaries” (e.g. 
delimited by mountain ranges or rivers), nor did they correspond well to the 
residential patterns of nations, tribes or ethnic groupings, quite a few of which 
were, moreover, nomadic. As a result the post-colonial states were often 
extremely ethnically diverse, hence vulnerable to ethnic strife, and awkwardly 
sized and/or shaped, e.g. landlocked, containing exclaves, unmanageably large 
or unsustainably small.29  
 
In many states, identities had been affected, e.g. because the colonial masters 
applied an ethnic or (almost always) a racial matrix to distinguish between 
various segments of the population under their control. These “manufactured 
identities” gradually became internalised, thereby forming the basis for many 
post-independence internecine conflicts, more about which later.30 Furthermore, 
most of the newly independent states (but with great variations between the 
various colonies) lacked a competent civil service to run the state’s institutions. 
In many cases, they did not even have the educational system to train such a 
civil service as most of the tertiary (and in some cases also secondary) education 
had taken place in the colonial motherland. Finally, most post-colonial states 
were born with a severely skewed economic structure, which made them 
critically dependent on the trade with the former colonial masters, or even on 
development aid. Whereas some of the colonial powers had constructed a certain 
infrastructure (e.g. roads and railways), most of this was designed for transport 
and communication between the “motherland” and its colony rather than 
between the various parts of the former colony (vide infra).31 
 
There is thus little doubt that the colonial past had a profound impact on 
developments after the achievement of independence. Hence the term “post-
colonialism” and “post-colonial states,”32 and the accompanying “post-colonial 
discourse”, which is, however, all too often used as an instrument of “buck-
passing”. First of all, it must be acknowledged that, in the vast majority of cases, 
colonialism ended almost half a century ago, and that in such a period other 
countries have managed to solve whatever problems they may have had with 
their past. Secondly, for all its indisputable merits, the postcolonial discourse 
may allow those leaders of the new independent states to evade responsibility 
for their own failures. As formulated by George Ayittey: 
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The constant vailing over colonial legacies was at best disingenuous and attributing much of 
Africa’s crisis to external factors alone was intellectually deficient. In fact, they became 
standard excuses that many African leaders conveniently employed to conceal their own 
failures and incompetence.33 
 
The Cold War and After 
Another “standard excuse”, in which there is also more than just a grain of truth, 
is that of Africa as a victim of the Cold War. This is sometimes combined with a 
related explanation of, or excuse for, Africa’s present troubles to the effect that 
the end of the Cold War has left the continent marginalised and powerless in the 
face of American unipolar power. Needless to say, it is very difficult to combine 
these two discourses of African victimisation without logical inconsistencies. 
 
Most African states did, indeed, achieve independence during the Cold War, i.e. 
they were “born” into a bipolar international system in the making of which they 
had played no part and in which they had no obvious stakes.34 In recognition 
thereof, many African states joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which 
played a certain role during the Cold War.35 However, there was very little 
scope for a middle way between the two superpowers, as each was inclined to 
interpret neutrality as tantamount to siding with the respective other. Hence, 
even though neither side may have been interested in an area per se the mere 
suspicion on the part of one superpower that the other might contemplate 
becoming involved was reason enough to get involved, preferably even pre-
emptively.36 
 
As a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict from around 1960, China also became 
involved, albeit less consistently and on a smaller scale, in African conflicts in 
order to reign in Soviet influence, often at the price of aligning itself with the 
lesser enemy, i.e. the United States. During the “Cultural Revolution” this was 
combined with the view of China as a natural leader of the Third World, in its 
turn seen as the source of a communist (or “anti-imperialist”) world revolution.37 
 
Even though Africa was merely a secondary (or even tertiary) arena for the 
global contest between East and West, the Cold War nevertheless impacted on 
some African conflicts.38 Not only were the two superpowers (and sometimes 
China) willing to provide African countries with weapons, often on quite 
favourable terms.39 They also had an interest in “winning the hearts and minds” 
of the peoples in Africa, which provided a certain incentive for them to provide 
development aid.40 These basically selfish superpower interests offered some 
opportunities for African states to play out one superpower against the other (or 
play “the China card”), e.g. by letting it be known that they might reconsider 
their sympathies and side with the respective other unless their “legitimate” 
 9
demands for development aid or military support were met.  
 
One consequence thereof may well have been that the total flow of arms to 
Africa was more substantial that it would have been in the absence of the Cold 
War, hence that bipolarity contributed to intensifying and/or prolonging armed 
conflicts on the continent.41 Another consequence may have been that certain 
African governments may have managed to survive for longer than they 
“deserved”. They could simply benefit from the “OSB logic”, according to 
which even the worst African or other Third World despot was eligible for 
support if only he was “Our Son-of-a-Bitch”.42 The US-supported Mobuto 
regime in Zaire and the Soviet-supported one of Mengistu in Ethiopia may be 
examples of this logic.43 While the provision of economic aid to Africa by the 
superpowers and their respective allies might appear as an undivided blessing, 
regardless of whatever selfish interests may have motivated it, this aid may also 
have had detrimental effects on the economic development of the recipient 
countries, as we shall see below in section 4.3.3.  
 
Just as the Cold War gave the superpowers an interest in becoming involved in 
Africa, it also offered them several reasons not to do so, unless some kind of 
cooperation, or at least a tacit understanding, with the respective other was 
possible.44 Neither of them was prepared to be “sucked into” an African conflict 
that might eventually result in them fighting each other directly, with all the 
accompanying risks of uncontrollable escalation.45 Hence the tendency 
(especially on the part of the USSR) to disengage before conflict might escalate 
out of control and pose risks of a direct confrontation between US and Soviet 
forces.46 
 
With the disappearance of these risks along with the bipolar conflict as such, 
there are no longer any such powerful security political reasons not to become 
involved.  Alas, however, with the end of the Cold War47 the Third World in 
general, and Africa in particular, have also lost their former geopolitical 
importance,48 indeed they may already have lost it with the Soviet reassessment 
of the importance of the Third World in the Gorbachev years.49 As a 
consequence, Africa has become increasingly marginalised, removing most of 
the incentives for the sole remaining superpower to become engaged in Africa,50 
especially if the costs are significant in terms of casualties, as they were deemed 
to be in the ill-fated US intervention in Somalia. Hence, the US reluctance to 
intervene in the genocide in Rwanda51 and its prevarication about whether or not 
to send peacekeeping troops to Liberia in the summer of 2003.52  
 
Whether the “war against terrorism” as well as against the “axis of evil” which 
was proclaimed by the United States after the 11 September attacks in 200153 
 10
will somehow allow some African states to escape marginalisation, say by 
making themselves important pieces in the total puzzle, remained, by the time of 
writing, to be seen. At least it had made the United States establish a new 
regional military headquarters in Djibouti (under the auspices of CENTCOM, 
i.e. the Central Command in charge of the Persian Gulf area, including occupied 
Iraq),54 and induced President George W. Bush to embark on a journey to 
selected African countries in July 2003.55  
 
Having now described the historical and international context of African 
conflicts, the time has come for some elaboration on the structural causes of 
these conflicts. This analysis will be attempted at a fairly high level of 
generalisation to which some analyst will surely object, claiming that all 
conflicts are unique. While there is certainly some truth in this, generalisation 
from individual cases is an indispensable, and therefore legitimate, element in 
any scholarly endeavour. Moreover, whatever excessive simplifications this may 
entail will, hopefully, be corrected by the case studies. The analysis will 
commence by what I have called “economic pathologies” and proceed with 
“nation and state pathologies” and a description of “the African security 
predicament”.     
 
Economic Pathologies 
As mentioned above, the economic point of departure for the new states in 
Africa was far from ideal, as they inherited in most cases from their colonial 
rulers a country with an infrastructure that was quite inadequate and which, at 
best, was designed to connect the production sites to the colonial motherland, 
but not to ensure communication within the country; a workforce which was 
inadequately trained, especially as far as white-collar jobs were concerned; and 
an economic structure which was designed the maximise the production of a 
narrow range of cash crops and other commodities for export. Even more 
importantly, they inherited a dependency on the developed world which had 
been deliberately forged by their colonial masters who had generally neglected 
economic ties between their own colonies and positively discouraged ties with 
the colonies of others—with a very low intensity of inter-African economic 
relations as a consequence.  
 
The Enigma of Africa’s Persistent Under-development  
At independence, virtually all African countries were thus seriously under-
developed—i.e. generally impoverished, endowed with a low and depleted 
capital stock, insufficient human resources, very uneven land distribution and a 
skewed economic structure, exhibiting an extraordinarily high proportion of 
GDP coming from agriculture and extractive industries (e.g. mining) and a very 
low proportion coming from manufacturing industries56—a structure mirrored in 
the distribution of the workforce, most members of which were found in 
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agriculture—the bottom line of which being extreme poverty. 
 
Today, i.e. around forty-something years hence, the situation has not improved 
significantly, and large tracts of Africa remain critically dependent on aid from 
the developed world, including their former colonial masters, and most of 
inhabitants continue to live in abject poverty (vide infra). This is more of an 
enigma than one might think. Other countries have started from more or less the 
same level of development (see Table 2), but have progressed significantly over 
the decades, most prominently the countries in East Asia, many of which have 
experienced a veritable economic miracle.57 
 
GDP Per Capita income Table 2: Average annual  
Growth rates (pct.) 58 1966-73 1974-90 1991-97 1966-73 1974-90 1991-97
Industrialised countries 4.8 2.6 2.0 3.9 2 1.3
Asia 5.5 6.3 8.5 2.9 4.3 6.9
Latin America 6.6 2.5 3.3 3.9 0.3 1.5
Africa 4.7 2.1 2.4 2.0 -0.9 -0.2
 
Economic Strategies: Neoclassical and Afro-Marxist 
Part of the explanation may, of course be that Africans have made serious 
mistakes with regard to their economic policies. We shall therefore commence 
with a survey of the economic theories and strategies, which have guided 
economic policies in Africa. 
 
As should come as no surprise in view of the low level of university education 
and research in Africa at independence, most of these theories have been of 
European or North American origins. Moreover, quite a few of them were 
somehow influenced by the Cold War, where the struggle between communism 
and democracy/capitalism was mirrored in an ideological controversy between 
marxist and liberal economic theory, the latter subdivided into Keynesian, 
neoclassic and monetarist theories.59 
 
From the United States came neo-classical economic theories about how to 
ensure the transition from a traditional to a modern economy such as that of 
Walt Rostow, who highlighted the critical stage of “take-off”, gradually leading 
up to the final stage of “mass consumption.”60 Referring to his work as an “anti-
communist manifesto”, it stands to reason that he did not at all recommend a 
(Keynesian or even Marxist) central role of the state in bringing about take-off. 
Rather, building on an analogy with the development of capitalism in the West, 
Rostow placed his trust in the emergence of an entrepreneurial class of 
capitalists, harnessing the forces of the market in general and the world market 
in particular, to gain access to modern technologies, bring about productivity 
growth and industrialisation—all with some transitory assistance, in the form of 
development aid, from the industrialised world, yet with the objective of 
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generating self-sustaining economic growth that would, in due course, make it 
superfluous. 
 
Understandably, the reliance on the market, which was not only favoured by the 
West but also by organisations such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), was interpreted by critics as simply a way of 
perpetuating dependency and economic imperialism, albeit without formal 
colonies. More specifically this was seen as furthering the interests of the United 
States, which had never relied on colonies, and which stood to prevail and 
achieve domination via the world market. Hence the charges by African leaders 
such as Kwame Nkrumah as well as western Marxists against “neo-
colonialism”,61 which were favourably responded to by the Soviet block62 
 
Other critics included economists working within the UN system such as Raoull 
Prebisch and other Latin Americans associated with ECLA (Economic 
Commission for Latin America),63 who developed a Dependencia theory with 
some Marxist inspiration. While certain critics such as the Norwegian 
sociologist and peace researcher Johan Galtung refused to be labelled Marxist,64 
other critics of the prevailing economic orthodoxy were avowed Marxists, such 
as Arghiri Emmanuel, Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel 
Wallerstein. Most of them had in common a systemic view of the world, which 
was analysed as an economic system for the generation of profits and the 
accumulation of capital. It fell roughly into two parts, labelled centre and 
periphery, respectively, by Wallerstein, while Frank preferred the terms 
metropole and satellite for roughly the same phenomena. 
 
Their claim was that profits were generated in the periphery/satellite countries 
and transferred to the centre/metropole as profits from direct investments, 
interests paid through debt servicing, etc, but also via what Emmanuel labelled 
“uneven exchange”, i.e. terms of trade that were systematically skewed in the 
centre’s favour—a theory to which an organisation such as UNCTAD (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development) remains partly committed.65 
Both Frank and Wallerstein also operated with notions of “semi peripheries” in 
two different senses, i.e. that of semi peripheral countries serving as links or 
nodes for the trade and other interaction between the centre and the periphery 
(as has been the case of countries such as Singapore), and that of internal semi 
peripheries (alternatively labelled “compradors”) consisting of certain sectors in 
periphery countries benefiting from the links, e.g. local capitalists, merchants 
and bureaucrats.66 As Africa clearly belongs to the periphery these theories, if 
correct, would certainly go a long way towards explaining the 
underdevelopment of the continent, whereas they would not really provide the 
answer to the enigma mentioned above, i.e. why Africa has been doing 
 13
significantly worse than other parts of the periphery such as East Asia. 
 
Both the diagnosis and the suggested cure was the exact opposite of those of 
neoclassical theories. While the latter saw global capitalism and the world 
market as locomotives of growth which would ensure that even the remotest and 
most backward countries would, in due course, modernise and prosper, the 
Marxists saw the capitalist-dominated world system with its free market as an 
impediment to economic development and therefore recommended a withdrawal 
from the market, albeit usually in rather vague and equivocal terms. More 
clearly they advocated a strengthening of productive structures in the periphery 
working for the needs of the population, and they foresaw a central economic 
role for the state in this respect.  
 
In most African states, the state did, indeed, come to play such a central role.67 
Partly under inspiration from the USSR and China (whose economies did, by 
that time, appear to thrive) the continent saw a surge of “African socialism.”68 
The first wave included countries such as Guinea, Ghana, Tanzania and others, 
where foreign property in the productive sector was often nationalised, thus 
creating a large public sector and huge parastatals, mostly in the extractive and 
heavy industries, combined with collectivisation schemes in the agricultural 
sector—some of which claimed, not without some justification, to build on 
traditional (i.e. pre-colonial) African modes of production.69 The second wave of 
African socialism came with the liberation of the former Portuguese colonies in 
1975, the victory of the liberation movements in their “second Chimurenga” in 
Rhodesia (then to become Zimbabwe in 1980) and the 1974 military coup or 
revolution in Ethiopia, which brought to power the Derg.70 The African 
countries which jumped this bandwagon of African socialism, however 
wholeheartedly, were usually eligible for Soviet or, in some cases, Chines 
development and other aid—even though the Cold War logic meant that this 
usually disqualified them from the assistance of the West, with the partial 
exception of the Scandinavian countries.  
 
To some extent bridging the divide between liberal and socialist theory (albeit 
leaning somewhat more towards Marxism) were those demands for a “New 
International Economic Order” (NIEO) which were voiced in the early 
seventies, e.g. under the auspices of UNCTAD in 1974, but subsequently also 
endorsed by the UN General Assembly.71 The latter in 1974 passed a Charter on 
the Economic Rights and Duties of States, which included the right and duty to 
“eliminate colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, [and] neo-colonialism” 
(art. 16). More specifically it obliged developed countries to grant, “generalised 
preferential, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment to developing 
countries” (art. 18), whilst explicitly condoning nationalisation of foreign 
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property (art. 2c).  
 
Demands such as the above, voiced by Africa and the rest of the Third World, 
were partly motivated by the worsening economic situation, which could partly 
be attributed to the deteriorating terms of trade. These were, of course, 
exacerbated for all African countries, except the oil-producing ones, by the 1974 
“oil crisis”. However, the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting 
Countries) experience was also seen as a source of inspiration by some who 
thought that similar cartels in other sectors could accomplish the same as OPEC, 
hopes which were soon revealed as groundless—not only because oil was 
special in terms of demand, but also because the typical export commodities of 
African countries, i.e. agricultural products, could not be easily withheld from 
the market to keep prices up.  
 
The NIEO controversy produced few tangible political results, and the 
continent’s economic problems continued to grow, indeed became what Nicolas 
van de Walle has aptly characterised as “a permanent crisis”.72 Inadequate 
economic performance was in many cases made up for with economic aid or 
loans, some of which were also utilised for (in most cases failed) attempts at 
economic modernisation, producing a growing national debt, also because a 
substantial part of development assistance came in the form of loans. By the 
early 1980s, several African countries thus found themselves locked in a “debt 
trap”, having to spend the better part of their export earnings on servicing their 
foreign debt—but the international financial institutions (IFI), and with them the 
rest of the developed world, also found themselves in a serious debt crisis. 
Beyond a certain size a loan ceases to be merely a problem of the borrower and 
also becomes one of the lender.73 
 
What made matters worse for the developing countries, however, was that both 
the World Bank and the IMF were by that time heavily influenced by the 
monetarist theories of the “Chicago School” around Milton Friedman and 
others,74 whose views became even more influential when Friedman was 
appointed to President Ronald Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board in 
1980. Hence the terms of negotiation were very tough, the Bretton Woods 
institutions typically insisting on public spending austerity, deflationary policies 
and a removal of protectionist barriers to trade.  
 
The Washington Consensus, Globalisation and Aid 
Out of the above economic crisis sprang a general “development pessimism” in 
the North. Combined with the end of the Cold War (labelled “the end of history” 
by Francis Fukuyama),75 this produced by the early 1990s what has been 
labelled “the Washington consensus” or the “new liberal orthodoxy” (NLO). 
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This entails an at least ostensible consensus on general principles such as the 
need for fiscal discipline, a priority on investment in public spending, tax reform 
(preferably reductions), financial, trade and currency exchange liberalisation, 
encouragement of foreign direct investment, privatisation of state enterprises 
and guaranteed property rights.76 
 
While this alleged consensus has certainly been challenged by critics,77 its main 
tenets are being implemented (e.g. by means of development aid 
conditionalities) by those donor governments sharing in the consensus as well as 
by the IMF and World Bank, who are implementing it, e.g. by means of 
structural adjustment programmes (SAP), to which many African countries have 
been subjected.78  In all fairness, however, it must be acknowledged that both 
the IMF and, to an even lager extent, the World Bank and many individual 
donors have abandoned their previous fixation on economic growth pure and 
simple to include also concerns for poverty reduction, sustainable development, 
good governance and, most recently, conflict issues, e.g. conflict prevention and 
the reconstruction of war-torn societies.79 
 
One of the reasons why the NLO was so powerful was that the international 
system was evolving in ways that made strategies of opting out of the 
Washington consensus in favour of national or even regional autarchy seem 
utterly unpromising—what is often referred to as “globalisation”. While it may 
be debatable to what extent globalisation is new and what exactly it entails,80 
there can probably be no disputing some of its main manifestations. Nor can 
there by any doubt that this impacts on the Third World, including Africa, in 
several ways, for good and perhaps mostly for bad.81  Not only is the volume of 
global trade increasing steadily, creating growing interdependency among 
national economies, but production is also becoming internationalised in new 
ways where the various components of a final product are produced in several 
countries. The revolutionary developments in information technologies mean 
that everything happens at a faster pace, including exchange rate fluctuations, 
some of which can cripple an already weak economy.   
 
Its global effects notwithstanding, globalisation is not evenly spread across the 
globe. Some regions risk marginalisation, which seems to be the fate that Africa 
has suffered.82 The more global trade moves into the information technologies 
the more it tends to by-pass Africa; and the more hi-tech production becomes, 
the less attractive Africa becomes for investors. Hence, Africa seems to become 
economically less and less important for the rest of the world, which has 
unfortunately coincided with a decline of its political importance as a 
consequence of the end of the Cold War. As the rest of the world and the 
technological revolution it is experiencing remains at least equally important for 
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Africa, the continent has been faced with the challenge of coping with the 
demands of globalisation, but from a vantage point of extreme weakness.  
 
One of the strategies selected has been to strengthen regional and sub-regional 
economic collaboration, e.g. by means of trade blocs, customs unions and free 
trade areas such ECOWAS (Economic Organisation of West African States), 
SACU (Southern African Customs Union), COMESA (Common Market of 
Eastern and Southern Africa), etc.83 However, even though this may boost intra-
regional economic transactions, there seem to be no realistic prospects for 
“European-style” economic integration, as the African economies are simply too 
similar to be able to achieve true complementarity.84 
 
Another strategy has been national accommodation to the above NLO, which 
requires states to liberalise and privatise their economies, as has, for instance, 
been the selected strategy of the Ethiopian government since the toppling of the 
Derg regime in 1991, or of Mozambique since the achievement of peace in 
1992.85  While this may make individual countries the darlings of the 
international donor community, the required policies usually come at a high 
price for the population. A combination of the two strategies is entailed by the 
launch, on the initiative of South Africa, of NEPAD (New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development), the main innovative feature of which may be the 
institutionalisation of an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is 
intended as a means of overseeing economic reform in African countries, partly 
as a precondition of eligibility for economic assistance from the developed 
world, conceived of as Africa’s “partners” in development.86 
 
One of the most striking and problematic features of Africa’s economic 
predicament has been the persistent need for external assistance, e.g. for 
development aid. This has been granted by wide array of actors, in various 
forms (including Official Development Assistance, ODA), spurred by a variety 
of motives and accompanied by a shifting panoply of conditionalities. Some of 
these conditionalities have been strictly economic (e.g. the insistence on 
sustainability) whereas others have included demands for good governance to 
which have been added concerns for conflict prevention and management and, 
most recently, for recipients to join in the global “war against terror”.87 
 
Most conspicuous, however, has been the declining volume of aid, reflecting a 
receding interest in Africa or the rest of the Third World on the part of the 
traditional donors. Table 3 shows the total volume of ODA granted to African 
LDCs to have risen from 1985 to 1990, but subsequently declined. It also shows 
the wide disparity in aid received by those for whom aid is ostensibly intended, 
i.e. the poor population, ranging in 1999 from a munificent 406 dollars per 
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Senegalese living in poverty (i.e. for less than one dollar per day) to a stingy 
three dollars for each Congolese in a similar, probably even worse, economic 
situation. Poverty reduction is thus seemingly not the only criterion applied for 
the allocation of aid, to put it mildly. 
 
Table 3: ODA to African LDCs88 Poor 
ODA 
p.c.
Country 1985 1990 1997 1998 1999 2000 (000) 
1999 
(US$)
Angola 91 269 355 335 388 307 8,535 45
Benin 95 268 221 211 211 239 1,029 205
Burkina Faso 195 331 368 400 398 366 6,446 62
Burundi 139 264 56 77 74 93 4,531 16
Cape Verde 70 108 111 130 137 94 n.a. n.a.
CAR 104 250 91 120 117 76 2,295 51
Chad 181 314 228 168 188 131 5,792 32
Zaire/DRC 306 897 158 126 132 184 42,340 3
Djibouti 81 194 85 81 75 71 352 213
Eq. Guinea 17 61 24 25 20 21 n.a. n.a.
Eritrea n.a. n.a. 123 167 149 176 n.a. n.a.
Ethiopia 719 1,016 579 660 643 693 51,011 13
Gambia 50 99 39 39 33 49 420 79
Guinea 115 293 381 359 238 153 4,492 53
Guinea-Bissau 58 129 124 96 52 80 897 58
Lesotho 93 142 92 66 31 42 912 34
Liberia 91 114 76 73 94 68 1,366 69
Madagascar 186 398 834 495 359 322 6,732 53
Malawi 113 503 343 434 446 445 6,031 74
Mali 376 482 429 347 354 360 7,229 49
Mauritania 207 237 238 172 219 212 763 287
Mozambique 300 1,002 948 1,040 804 876 6,650 121
Niger 303 396 333 292 187 211 7,301 26
Rwanda 180 291 230 350 373 322 4,507 83
Sao Tome/Principe 12 55 33 28 28 35 n.a. n.a.
Senegal 289 818 423 501 536 423 1,321 406
Sierra Leone 65 61 119 106 74 182 2,874 26
Somalia 353 494 81 80 115 104 6,307 18
Sudan 1,129 822 139 209 243 225 6,487 37
Togo 484 1,173 945 1,000 990 1,045 2,878 344
Uganda 3 5 10 5 7 4 8,681 1
Tanzania 180 668 813 647 591 819 24,785 24
Zambia 322 480 610 349 623 795 7,547 83
Sub-Saharan 
African LDCs 6,907 12,634 9,639 9,188 8,929 9,223 n.a. n.a.
All LDC 9,492 16,752 13,036 12,806 12,325 12,476 494,626 25
All Dev. Countries 30,255 56,471 48,041 50,247 51,677 50,310 n.a. n.a.
Legend: Poor number of people living for less than one dollar a day 
 
That the volume of aid is declining is not necessarily a bad thing, as quite a 
strong argument can be made to the effect that aid, whatever its stated rationale, 
may actually do more harm than good, e.g. by postponing much needed 
 18
economic reforms, by bolstering regimes that had better be toppled, prolonging 
conflicts,89 etc. Nicolas van de Walle thus claims that 
 
[A]id resources and in particular the aid given for the purpose of structural adjustment, have 
served an essentially conservative function in the region, by lessening the incentives African 
governments have to undertake policy reform. The combination of massive aid increases and 
uneven or ineffective policy conditionality has ensured the sustainability of policies that 
otherwise would have been disciplined by market forces. In brief, aid has made reform less 
likely, not more.90 
 
That reforms are indeed needed will be argued in the following. 
 
The Economic Predicament of Africa 
The economic structure of African societies has not changed much over the last 
twenty years or, indeed, since colonial times, as agriculture still makes up for a 
large share of GDP, whereas industry’s share is declining (see Table 4). The 
share of services has gone up, but this is far from a sign of movement towards a 
post-industrial society, as it might be in the developed world, but rather a sign of 
the growth of the informal sectors of the economy, such as street vendors91 
 
Moreover, the large agricultural sector notwithstanding, Africa is still 
experiencing repeated shortages of staple foods and recurrent food crises. In 
2003, for instance, FAO (the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation) reported 
food emergencies in 23 countries (Angola, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Central 
African Republic, the two Congos, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe) citing reasons 
such as drought, economic disruption, civil strife and migration, the latter 
including both IDPs (internally displaced persons) and  returnees, i.e. people 
returning from a refuge in neighbouring countries.92 
 
Table 4:  Gross Domestic Product by Sector93 
 Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 
 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 
Africa 22.3 20.0 39.0 26.3 8.7 13.2 38.7 53.7 
North 13.5 16.6 48.5 37.6 8.8 11.3 38.0 45.8 
West 33.7 36.3 18.6 28.6 5.9 7.7 47.7 35.1 
Central 28.9 20.9 32.7 38.2 6.8 10.1 38.4 40.9 
East 32.6 38.3 16.6 18.2 8.3 7.5 50.8 43.5 
Southern 22.9 11.0 28.3 37.4 10.8 20.5 48.8 51.6 
 
One of the reasons of the poor yield of agriculture may be the setting aside of 
vast land (usually the best quality) for cash crops, intended for exports. Another 
explanation may be the very uneven distribution of land found throughout the 
continent, especially in the former settler colonies, which has also given rise to 
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political disturbances, e.g. in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 94 
 
The poor yields of agriculture may be a sufficient explanation for the lacking 
industrialisation, as agriculture has been unable to generate any capital that 
might have been invested in other sectors. Another explanation may be that the 
amount of what might have made up for the shortage, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), remains low, as shown in Table 5.   
 
Table 5: World FDI Inflows 95 (percent) 
Group/Region 1986-90 1991-92 1993-98 1999-2000 2001 
Developed Countries 82.4 66.5 61.2 80.0 68.4 
Developing Countries 17.5 31.2 35.3 17.9 27.9 
Africa 1.8 2.2 1.8 0.8 2.3 
Latin America/Car. 5.0 11.7 12.3 7.9 11.6 
 Asia and Pac. 10.6 17.4 21.2 9.2 13.9 
East-Central Eur. 0.1 2.2 3.5 2.0 3.7 
Memorandum LDC 0.4 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.5 
 
Its level is down from 25 percent in the early 1970s to a mere five percent of 
total FDI in developing countries in 2000. Moreover, what little FDI remains is 
very unevenly distributed, South Africa receiving no less than 8.7 billion US 
dollars out of a total for sub-Saharan Africa of 10.7 billion in the 1995-99 
period. In all fairness, however, it must be acknowledged that South Africa is 
investing heavily in the rest of Africa, averaging around one billion a year, a 
good part of which may well be “recycled” non-African FDI.96 
 
That there is little FDI in Africa does not mean that foreign capital is absence. In 
fact, many African countries are so heavily indebted that the servicing of their 
foreign debt constitutes a serious drain on their export earnings, especially as far 
as the poorest countries are concerned, as shown in Table 6. 
 
Part of Africa’s problems with employing and feeding its population, evidenced 
by low GDP per capita figures, may be that the total population continues to 
grow. Demographic patterns in Africa do not yet show any clear signs of what 
has been called “demographic transition”,97 i.e. of such a shift towards low 
fertility as well as mortality rates as has historically accompanied modernisation, 
producing a stable population size. 
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Table 6:  Debt burden of African LDC98 
 Debt. ($ mill) Debt service ($ mill) Debt/GDP % Debt Serv/exports %
Country 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998/9 1980 1990 1997/8
Angola 3,045 8,348 8314 372 328 588 45 81 97 15 8 16
Benin 774 1,394 1701 38 48 54 74 76 72 15 18 14
Burkina Faso 574 1,094 1539 32 36 56 40 40 60 21 10 16
Burundi 476 1,017 1115 26 54 34 41 90 156 20 61 48
Cape Verde 108 139 366 6 7 17 n.a. 41 63 n.a. 16 14
CAR 354 861 855 30 36 40 41 58 81 17 16 24
Chad 172 593 1092 15 15 36 17 34 71 12 6 11
Zaire/DRC 5,795 10,318 9094 654 555 124 81 110 208 33 20 6
Djibouti 305 210 350 40 28 10 89 49 66 n.a. n.a. 6
Eq. Guinea 111 196 226 12 7 8 139 148 32 50 17 2
Eritrea n.a. n.a. 220 n.a. n.a. 4 n.a. n.a. 34 n.a. n.a. 4
Ethiopia 4,135 8,441 9205 153 189 112 62 123 143 28 35 11
Gambia 241 390 514 13 35 28 107 123 143 13 18 13
Guinea 1,335 2,596 3259 82 174 148 n.a. 92 94 n.a. 20 18
Guinea-Bissau 380 626 822 17 8 7 264 257 377 121 33 23
Lesotho 169 469 999 22 29 122 58 75 114 54 28 51
Liberia 1,400 1,731 1507 87 71 30 128 n.a. n.a. 19 n.a. n.a.
Madagascar 2,139 3,538 3977 145 265 153 75 115 107 41 52 19
Malawi 1,034 1,557 2594 120 116 108 91 86 143 44 26 19
Mali 1,463 2,548 3109 56 80 95 111 105 121 25 10 15
Mauritania 1,469 2,041 2285 115 151 106 215 200 239 28 32 27
Mozambique 2,276 4,168 7001 184 125 123 51 166 176 145 61 30
Niger 1,239 1,796 1497 124 136 53 86 72 74 42 37 14
Rwanda 374 806 1275 27 32 24 22 31 65 14 22 22
Sao Tome/Pr. 86 128 253 4 2 5 165 221 538 44 25 42
Senegal 2,467 4,362 4286 176 391 267 96 77 90 24 13 39
Sierra Leone 632 657 1067 43 28 37 53 73 159 24 13 39
Somalia 1,884 2,165 2005 56 35 9 215 236 n.a. 102 139 n.a.
Sudan 8,346 11,139 9288 281 25 61 67 85 96 39 n.a. n.a.
Togo 984 1,460 1605 78 124 46 129 90 114 21 23 10
Uganda 1,156 2,406 3622 150 121 165 33 56 56 31 39 24
Tanzania 3,393 5,420 6043 112 177 269 n.a. 127 69 n.a. 33 24
Zambia 4,532 5,462 6153 219 246 162 201 166 195 21 21 19
 
While mortality has declined significantly (at least until the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
took hold, vide infra), fertility remains high. Hence, population growth 
continues almost throughout the continent, with a few exceptions such as 
Mauritius,99 and the total population is expected to quadruple over the next fifty 
years (see Table 7). 
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1955-60 1965-70 1975-80 1985-90 1995-2000 Table 7:  Birth and 
Death Rates100 Births Deaths Births Deaths Births Deaths Births Deaths Births Deaths
Region Per 1000 
Africa 25 49 21 47 18 46 15 43 14 39 
Northern 22 47 19 45 14 41 10 35 8 28 
Eastern 26 50 21 49 19 48 17 46 18 43 
Middle 26 46 23 47 19 47 17 47 16 46 
Southern 19 43 15 40 12 36 10 32 12 28 
Western 27 50 23 49 20 49 17 46 15 42 
Asia 20 40 14 38 10 29 9 28 8 22 
Europe 10 21 10 17 10 15 11 14 12 10 
Latin America 14 41 11 38 9 33 7 28 7 23 
Northern America 9 25 9 18 9 15 9 16 8 14 
World 17 36 13 34 11 28 10 27 9 23 
 
Hence the population of Africa as well as its share of world population is 
forecast to grow, as set out in Chart 1.101 
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As a result, Africa is likely to see a growing number of inhabitants, whose lives 
may well turn out to be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” because of 
deteriorating living conditions.102 Whereas the number of people living on less 
than one dollar a day has been declining globally over the last decade, both in 
absolute numbers and as a percentage, it has thus risen in Africa (see Table 8). 
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Table 8: Global Poverty: People Living on Less than a Dollar a Day103 
Percentage Number Region 1990 1999 1990 1999 
Sub-Saharan Africa 47.4 49.0 241 315 
East Asia and Pacific  30.5 15.6 486 279 
South Asia 45.0 36.6 506 488 
Latin America/Caribbean 11.0 11.1 48 57 
Central/Eastern Europe and CIS 6.8 20.3 31 97 
Middle East/North Africa 2.1 2.2 5 6 
Total 29.6 23.2 1,292 1,169 
 
A large number of these impoverished people are going to be urban youth, as 
both rapid urbanisation and a large percentage of young people continue to 
characterise all of Africa (see Table 9). Unless job creation takes a huge leap 
forward, the coming years are thus going to see a growing number of jobless 
young urban residents, which surely bodes ill for political stability.104   
 
Table 9: Urban Youth105 (countries listed according to  human development index rank) 
Urban Population 
(percent) 
Under 15 
(percent) 
Urban Population 
(percent) 
Under 15 
(percent) Country 
1975 2001 2001 
Country 
1975 2001 2001 
Seychelles 33.3 64.5 n.a. Mauritania 20.3 59.0 43.2
Mauritius 43.4 41.6 25.5 Eritrea 12.7 19.1 45.7
Cape Verde 21.4 63.3 40.9 Senegal 34.2 48.1 43.8
South Africa 48.0 57.6 33.6 Guinea 16.3 27.9 44.1
Eq. Guinea  27.1 49.2 43.5 Rwanda 4.0 6.3 45.3
Gabon 40.0 82.1 41.3 Benin 21.9 43.0 45.9
Sao Tome/Pr. 27.0 47.6 41.2 Tanzania 10.1 33.2 45.6
Namibia 20.6 31.4 43.2 Cote d’Ivoire 32.1 44.0 42.3
Botswana 12.8 49.4 40.0 Malawi 7.7 15.1 45.9
Ghana 30.1 36.4 40.6 Zambia 34.8 39.8 46.4
Swaziland 14.0 26.7 44.0 Angola 17.8 34.8 47.4
Lesotho 10.8 28.7 40.2 Chad 15.6 24.2 46.6
Sudan 18.9 37.0 39.9 Guinea-Bissau 15.9 32.3 46.9
Congo 35.0 66.0 46.6 DRC 29.5 n.a. 46.8
Togo 16.3 33.9 44.1 CAR 33.7 41.7 43.1
Cameroon 26.9 49.6 42.7 Ethiopia 9.5 15.9 45.8
Zimbabwe 19.6 36.0 43.5 Mozambique 8.7 33.2 44.0
Kenya 12.9 34.3 42.7 Burundi 3.2 9.3 47.5
Uganda 8.3 14.5 50.0 Mali 16.2 30.8 49.2
Madagascar 16.3 30.1 44.7 Burkina Faso 6.3 16.9 48.9
Gambia 17.0 31.2 41.1 Niger 10.6 21.0 49.7
Nigeria 23.4 44.8 44.8 Sierra Leone 21.4 37.3 44.0
Djibouti 68.9 84.2 43.0 Legend: Under 15:  percent of total population 
_ 
  
Depressing, as the above may seem, there may be signs of improvement. 
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What may warrant a moderately optimistic reading of Africa’s future is that 
most recent economic trends have been surprisingly positive, as shown in Table 
10. 
 
Table 10: Selected Economic Indicators, 
1998-2002106 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
GDP growth (Africa) 3.1 3.2 3.5 4.3 3.4
West 3.6 3.2 2.7 3.3 3.7
Central 4.9 4.4 4.4 4.9 4.4
East 2.5 4.1 3.1 5.0 5.2
Southern 
Percent 
1.7 2.2 3.0 2.4 3.5
Exports 98.8 105.9 133.1 132.8 n.a.
Imports 104.4 104.4 110.4 117.8 n.a.
Trade Balance 
US$ bill. 
-5.6 1.4 22.7 15.0 n.a.
External debt US$ bill. 291.4 290.8 285.1 275.1 n.a.
Debt service payment % of exports 23.3 21.4 18.0 18.9 n.a.
Inflation Percent 10.8 11.5 13.6 12.6 n.a.
 
Not only has GDP growth been fairly steady and rising, but inflation has also 
been kept under control, and the trade balance has improved with a slight 
alleviation of the debt situation as a result. A partial explanation of the positive 
trade balance may be a substantial increase in exports to the United States as a 
consequence of the passing of the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act in 
June 2000.107 Moreover, Africa seems to have been (so far, at least) less affected 
by the global economic recession following in the wake of the 11 September 
attacks than most other regions.108 
 
However, the aggregate figures in Table 10 conceal enormous disparities among 
countries. For instance, the rather modest average inflation rates conceal 
countries with serious problems in this respect (such as the DRC with a 
hyperinflation of 553 percent in 2000 or Angola with 325 percent); and national 
growth figures span from a negative growth of 7.3 percent in Zimbabwe to an 
incredible positive growth (based on off-shore oil) in Equatorial Guinea of 65 
percent in 2001 (sic).109 
 
UNCTAD distinguishes between four different categories within the category of 
LDCs, to which most of Africa belongs (See Table 11). Oil-producing countries 
have generally been doing quite well, of which there are seven in sub-Saharan 
Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria. They tend to be doing significantly better than the 
rest in terms of GDP growth, but not at all well according to other yardsticks 
such as poverty reduction.110 Moreover, even in countries experiencing rapid 
growth, this may be so unevenly distributed as to do little to alleviate poverty, as 
may, indeed, be the case of Equatorial Guinea, where the richest five percent 
control eighty percent of the total income.111   
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Table 11: Economic Growth in African LDCs (annual average, 
percent)112 
Real GDP growth p.c. Real GDP growth p.c.  
High       
Eq Guinea 19.4 16.2  Cape Verde 7.0 3.9 
Mozambique 7.6 5.4  Burkina Faso 5.9 3.3 
Rwanda 6.9 4.2  Uganda 6.0 3.1 
Moderate      
Senegal 5.3 2.4  Mali 4.7 2.2 
Gambia 5.5 2.3  Tanzania 4.6 2.1 
Central Afr. Rep. 4.1 2.3  Benin 4.8 2.1 
Slow   
Madagascar 4.5 1.3  Malawi 3.0 0.8 
Angola 4.1 1.2  Niger 4.2 0.7 
Guinea 3.4 1.0  Ethiopia 3.1 0.6 
Mauretania 4.3 1.0  Sao Tome/Princ. 2.7 0.4 
Regressing    Zambia 1.2 -1.0 
Chad 2.6 -0.2  Togo 1.2 -1.8 
Djibouti 1.3 -0.6  Sierra Leone -2.1 -4.1 
Burundi 1.3 -0.6  Eritrea -1.6 -4.3 
Lesotho 0.8 -0.7  Guinea-Bissau -5.6 -7.5 
 
What make the prospects for Africa especially unpredictable, but most likely 
bleaker than suggested by the above, are the consequences of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. The incidence of AIDS in Africa is truly mind-boggling, with the 
estimated number of infected persons in 2001 amounting to 29.4 million, 
causing 2.4 million deaths—but not averting approximately 3.5 million new 
infections. Among those living with HIV infection are ten million youngsters 
(age 15-24) and three million children under fifteen. The epidemic has reduced 
life expectancies in sub-Saharan Africa from 62 to 47 years.113  
 
Whereas other epidemics (such as the medieval plague in Europe, known as the 
“Black Death”) may have had certain benign long-term economic 
consequences,114 the economic consequences of the AIDS epidemic are unlikely 
to work this way, at least according to most analyses. The UN agency UNAIDS, 
in a paper produced for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg in 2002, thus enumerated the detrimental economic effects:  
 
By robbing communities and nations of their greatest wealth—their people—AIDS drains the human 
and institutional capacities that fuel sustainable development. (...) By draining human resources, the 
epidemic distorts labour markets, disrupts production and consumption, and ultimately diminishes 
national wealth. (...) Productive capacities—including in the informal sector—are eroded as workers 
and managers fall prey to the disease. Flagging consumption, along with the loss of skills and 
capacities, in turn drains public revenue and undermines the State’s ability to serve the common 
interest of development and human well-being. The cycle is dynamic and vicious. (...) Negative 
development and HIV/AIDS lock into a dynamic relationship, whereby one feeds on the other.115 
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Having thus described the economic predicament of Africa, we are left with 
explaining how this might impact on its conflict-proneness, to which the 
following section is devoted. 
  
The Economy and Conflict 
A large body of literature exists on the economic causes of conflict, establishing 
causal relations in both directions. Not only do economic factor impact on 
conflicts, both by affecting their likelihood and their intensity, but conflict also 
impacts on the economy. This interrelationship could easily translate into a 
chicken-and-egg puzzle, as the economic consequences of conflict might well 
contribute to a new round of conflict, having economic consequences, etc. ad 
infinitum. The following, inevitably superficial, account is nevertheless 
subdivided accordingly, i.e. beginning with the economic causes and proceeding 
with the economic consequences of conflict, in both cases with some tentative 
indications as to the implications for Africa.  
 
As far as economic causes of conflict are concerned, we find relevant 
hypotheses at both the macro and the micro level. At the macro-level, a number 
of theories have established a correlation between trade, interdependency and 
war-proneness. First of all, trade is arguably a central element in the fashionable 
“liberal peace” thesis, according to which liberal states are unlikely to go to war 
against each other. Trading states are allegedly less prone to wars of aggression 
than others, also because they do not really need territory in the sense that 
agrarian countries do, hence are unlikely to go to war for it.116  An extension of 
this theory includes other forms of interaction, whilst specifying that it is not 
volume as such that matters, but the importance of this interaction. According to 
these theories, the greater the interdependency between countries (economically 
or otherwise), the less likely they are to go to war against each other.117 If these 
hypotheses hold true, the implied predictions for Africa are not favourable, as no 
African state would seem to fall within the category of trading states, and as 
economic or other interdependence between African states remains very low and 
is unlikely to rise in the foreseeable future.  
 
At the micro-level we find a number of theories about the links between poverty 
and war, mentioned in chapter one. Most agree that poverty is not a cause of 
conflict as such, but that (economic and other) inequalities may produce 
distributional conflicts.118 One manifestation of this phenomenon may be the 
several conflicts in Africa waged over resources such as oil, timber, diamonds 
and minerals—both by states, rebel movements and warlords. I shall return to 
these phenomena under the heading of “greed and survival conflicts” below. 
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As far as the economic consequences of conflict are concerned, an array of 
theories and hypotheses seem relevant, including those, which deal with the 
economic impact of that military spending which is an almost inevitable by-
product of conflict. Whereas Émile Benoit argued in favour of a positive link 
between the two, referring to the alleged modernising effects of the military,119 
most analysts have arrived at the opposite conclusion, i.e. that military spending 
comes at the expense of development.120 The multiplier effects of military 
spending which may operate in developed countries121 tend to pale into 
insignificance in the Third World, including Africa. This is especially the case 
for countries relying exclusively on arms imports for equipping their armed 
forces, but it is also the case of such  “third tier arms producers”122 as South 
Africa.  They manufacture, at best, a small share of their total arms 
consumption, their products are seldomly really competitive on the world 
market, and they usually depend on licenced production, inter alia because they 
cannot afford an indigenous research and development (R&D) programme.123 
 
The only exception to this general rule that military spending harms the 
economy may be that there seems to be a positive correlation between military 
spending and ODA. However, this may well be a spurious correlation, reflecting 
the fact that these countries may be strategically important and therefore have 
both their military and civilian economies boosted by external assistance. 
Against a causal relationship also speaks the fact that international financial 
institutions and donor agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank 
increasingly tend to view excessive military spending as disqualifying countries 
from aid.124 The correlation may therefore soon become a thing of the past.  
 
Some attempts have been made at quantifying the economic (and social) 
consequences of armed conflict.125 Even though there are numerous 
methodological problems involved in such analyses, including the large number 
of counterfactuals to which analysts need to resort,126 quite convincing estimates 
have been produced of the staggering economic costs of the conflicts in 
Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda and Somalia.127 A special case, which has been 
receiving considerable attention through the 1990s, is the long-term economic 
effects of the (mostly anti-personnel) landmines, which have been employed in 
huge numbers in several of Africa’s civil wars. Even after the signing of a peace 
agreement, their very presence may hamper a resumption of agricultural 
production, thereby postponing post-war economic recovery—as has, for 
instance, been the case in Mozambique and as will certainly be the case in 
Angola. 128  
 
This is merely a special case of the new body of literature dealing with what we 
may call  “the political economy of reconstruction.”129 Besides the often-
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enormous costs of rebuilding the physical infrastructure of a country after war, 
there are substantial costs involved in securing the human capital of a war-torn 
country. This calls for, inter alia, the disarmament, demobilisation and 
repatriation and reintegration (DDR&R) of former combatants into civilian 
society, usually presupposing cash payments, vocational training, etc. which is 
often well beyond the means of a country coming out of a protracted civil 
war.130 
 
We have thus seen that Africa is haunted by economic problems and that these 
tend to increase the likelihood of conflict, but also that violent conflict tends to 
exacerbate already existing economic problems. These economic problems are, 
furthermore, intertwined with the political problems (“nation and state 
pathologies”) to which we shall now turn. 
 
Nation and State Pathologies 
As argued in the chapter three, the era of colonialism cut short what might have 
been a process of indigenous nation and state-building in Africa, replacing 
African forms of governance with colonial forms of “quasi-statehood”, lacking 
the central element of sovereignty which rested with the colonial power. 
 
Fast track Nation and State-building 
Upon their achievement of independence, the new African states found 
themselves vested with the aforementioned legacy of colonial political and 
administrative structures in combination with various scattered elements of 
traditional rule, which had survived from the pre-colonial era, often as 
components of indirect rule. What resulted from this blend was, in most cases, a 
combination of formal political structures (usually codified in a constitution 
modelled on that of the colonial power) with an informal power structure 
bearing very little resemblance with the formal one. 
 
Problems have been compounded by the simultaneity and “telescoping together” 
of nation and state-building, where African states have been expected to do 
within the span of decades what the European countries did over the same 
number of centuries, i.e. create both nations and states, able to fit into the pre-
existing state system.  As aptly put by Mohammed Ayoob, 
 
[W]e can well imagine the enormity of the challenge faced by the postcolonial states of the Third 
World. The problem for those states has been compounded by the fact that they are under pressure to 
demonstrate adequate stateness quickly and to perform the task of state making in a humane, civilized, 
and consensual fashion—all in an era of mass politics. The inadequacy of the time element and the 
fact that several sequential phases involved in the state-making process have had to be collapsed or 
telescoped together into one mammoth state-building enterprise go a long way in explaining the 
security predicament of the Third World state. 131  
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As illustrated in Fig. 1, not only have African and other Third World states been 
expected to develop a functioning state with the requisite administrative capacity 
to provide for both security, infrastructure and various welfare functions; and to 
find their place within an already established state system. They have also been 
expected to ensure that this incipient state complied with the now well-
established norms within this state system of democracy, human rights and good 
governance; and their states have been supposed to conform to the paradigm of 
the nation-state—norms which had gradually developed in Europe over 
centuries.   
 
Fig. 1: Statebuilding in Europe and Africa 
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In Europe the state as a sovereign political entity thus dates back to around the 
16th century,132 and the state system to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.133 
Democracy only appeared as a norm with the 1789 French Revolution and, in 
most cases, much later as a reality.134 Nationalism began to grow around the 
middle of the 19th century with the notion that state boundaries ought to conform 
to those of the nation resulting, among other things, in turmoil in the Habsburg 
and Ottoman empires and in the unification of Germany in 1871.135 Even though 
civil rights are of a somewhat older vintage, dating back to US independence 
and the French revolution, human rights did not until 1948 become codified in 
binding conventions, thus completing the picture of the modern state as we 
know it. 
 
 In Africa, all these gigantic tasks have had to be fulfilled in the span of 
the around four decades that have passed since the achievement of 
independence. That only few states have been able to accomplish this 
gargantuan task to perfection is thus hardly surprising. Rather, most states have 
exhibited one or several of the following features, which might be labelled “state 
pathologies”. 
 
Ethnic Diversity and Strife 
Partly as a result of the artificial boundaries drawn by the European colonial 
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powers, most African states are hosts to a diversity of ethnic groups and nations, 
i.e. they are multinational states.136 For instance, Nigeria includes within its 
borders no less than three major ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba) 
and between two and four hundred “ethnic minorities”.137 
 
Unless the new state succeeds in fostering a sense of political nationhood, built 
around the notion of citizenship, to supersede ethnic or tribal identities—which 
often presupposes that state institution perform satisfactorily—people all too 
often direct their identification and loyalties towards their respective tribe or 
ethnic group. From such identification often springs conflict,138 which is 
frequently violent and which may even reach genocidal levels, as it has done on 
more than one occasion in Rwanda and Burundi. 
  
In any case, ethnic strife tends to weaken the state, the institutions of which are 
often viewed as the prize for which to struggle in ethnic conflicts, as it can both 
ensure privileges to the members of the ethnic group controlling it and constitute 
a threat to those who do not—a clear case of the so-called “security dilemma of 
ethnic conflict”.139 In the absence of effective mechanisms for power-sharing 
such as federalism or consociationalism,140 the state tends to be weakened by 
ethnic strife, if only because this frequently leads to secessionist attempts, as 
with the Katanga and Biafra wars mentioned above, or the various ethnic 
conflicts in Ethiopia.141     
 
Neopatromonial Rule 
One of the reasons why Africans tend not to identify with their respective states 
is that these states do not function satisfactorily. Most African states are 
characterised by neopatrimonial rule, where the real power structure consists of 
a web of personal ties. While traditional patrimonialism (as described by Max 
Weber and others)142 rested on authentic tradition, e.g. in the form of legitimate 
succession to power or religious legitimation (as with the Golden Stool of the 
Ashanti or the legendary descent of Ethiopian kings and emperors from King 
Solomon),143 neopatrimonialism is built around “strong-men”, often coming 
from the economic sphere or from the military.144 Power is personalised and 
based on patron-client relations, where the patron enjoys the support of his 
clients in return for the favours he is able to bestow on them, e.g. in the form of 
jobs or protection, all in a very informal manner, in fact presupposing a primacy 
of the informal. 
 
While neopatrimonialism is thus the antithesis of the Weberian meritocracy, it 
may nevertheless be tantamount to a social contract of sorts, as argued by 
Patrice Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz in a recent book with the telling title 
Africa Works, who also find traces of accountability and representation:  
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[T]he foundations of political accountability in Africa are both collective and extra-institutional: they 
rest on the particularistic links between Big Men, or patrons, and their constituent communities (...) 
That is why, despite the undeniably large gap (in terms of resources and lifestyle) between elites and 
populace, leaders are never dissociated from their supporters. They remain directly linked to them 
through a myriad of nepotistic or clientilistic networks staffed by dependent intermediaries.145 
 
It is, however, also possible to hold a much less favourable view of 
neopatrimonial rule and to view it as one of the vehicles for predation and 
illegitimate extraction and waste of scarce resources by a “vampire state”, as 
argued by George Ayittey in his work with the equally telling title Africa in 
Chaos:  
   
[I]n Africa, government officials do not serve the people. The African state has been reduced 
to a mafia-like bazaar, where everyone with an official designation can pillage at will. In 
effect, it is a “state” that has been hijacked by gangsters, crooks, and scoundrels. (...) The 
inviolate ethic of vampire elites is self-aggrandizement and self-perpetuation in power. To 
achieve those objectives, they subvert every institution of government: the civil service, 
judiciary, military, media, and banking. As a result, these institutions become paralyzed. (...) 
Regardless of their forms, the effects of clientelism are the same. Politics is viewed as 
essentially extractive. The state sector becomes fused with the political arena and is seen as a 
source of wealth, and therefore, personal aggrandizement.146 
 
For all its possible merits, neopatrimonialism thus tends to lack accountability147 
and to privilege certain groups over others, often by being linked to the ethnic 
divides in society. 
 
Table 12: 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index148 
Rank Country Score Rank Country Score
1 Finland 9.7 68 Malawi 2.9
10 United Kingdom 8.7 71 Côte d’Ivoire 2.7
16 United States 7.7 75 Tanzania 2.7
24 Botswana 6.4 76 Zimbabwe 2.7
25 France 6.3 80 Zambia 2.6
28 Namibia 5.7 90 Cameroon 2.2
38 South Africa 4.8 94 Uganda 2.1
42 Mauritius 4.5 97 Kenya 1.9
50 Ghana 3.9 98 Angola 1.7
61 Ethiopia 3.5 99 Madagascar 1.7
66 Senegal 3.1 101 Nigeria 1.6
 
Another factor that weakens the state, inter alia as a consequence of 
neopatrimonialism and the lack of accountability is the propensity for 
“kleptocracy”, i.e. of state agents abusing their power for personal gain—as was 
most grotesquely practiced in Mobuto’s Zaïre.149 This is not only a problem at 
the pinnacle of society, but corruption is endemic all the way down to the 
lowliest civil servants and traffic wardens.150 
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Table 12 provides a “corruption perceptions index” for 2003, which is computed 
annually by the NGO Transparency International. It shows most African 
countries as scoring very low in comparison with the selected Western countries 
thrown in for comparison.  Measuring expectations of corruption among 
government officials rather than their actual corruption, it shows Africans to be 
accustomed to corruption, perhaps even to the point of experiencing it as the 
normal way of “doing business”. 
 
Attempted Democratisation 
Democracy is usually seen as the antithesis of (neo-) patrimonialism as well as a 
good safeguard against kleptocracy, as it supposedly ensures accountability. 
However, at least until recently Africa’s experience with democracy was far 
from an unqualified success.151 Either democracy has not lasted, but 
democratically elected governments have been toppled by the military (vide 
infra), or government has been usurped by leaders, who may well have been 
democratically elected in the first place, but who were not inclined to relinquish 
power. 
 
Most African states have therefore seen an alternation between, and sometimes 
even a combination of, one-party systems and military rule, with governments 
elected through free and fair multiparty elections constituting, at most, 
democratic interludes. For all their faults and shortcomings, however, it is 
important not to confuse the African versions of one-party rule (or “no-party” 
government, as in Museveni’s Uganda)152 with totalitarian rule as known from 
communist countries. Even though quite a few of the one-party systems have 
been ideologically Marxist or even Marxist-Leninist, and even though some of 
them have sought to build “vanguard” communist parties,153 they have generally 
failed in this endeavour. African parties have, with a few exceptions, been fairly 
open and diverse structures bearing little resemblance to parties such as the 
Soviet or Chinese communist parties, exhibiting ideological “purity” and 
orthodoxy, governed by democratic centralism and with a firm grip on all 
aspects of society.154 Still, genuine democracy is, of course, incompatible with 
one-party rule, as it presupposes polyarchy.155  
 
What further exacerbates the fragility of democracy are the very facts of 
dependency, implying that the state is often confronted with conflicting 
demands and a need for “dual accountability”, vis-à-vis its electorate and foreign 
donors, the demands of which are not automatically compatible.  While the 
voters may demand increased public expenditures on welfare and job creation, 
foreign donors often demand the exact opposite. When demands are not met, the 
government in question may resort to all sorts of machinations, which inevitably 
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undermines democracy.156 In response, the voters whose demands are not met 
may turn to violence. 
 
Since the early 1990s, however, a global wave of democratisation seems to have 
reached Africa. This has coincided with the end of the Cold War, but is not 
necessarily related to it, even though it has afforded the great powers of Europe 
and North America the “luxury” of being able to put pressure on non-democratic 
states to democratise.157 It has also well nigh removed alternative avenues to 
legitimacy, as the norm of democracy has now become universally 
acknowledged,158 albeit perhaps “more honour’d in the breach than the 
observance” (Hamlet, I.4). As we shall see in chapter five, it has also been 
acknowledged by the regional and sub regional institutions in Africa, which 
have even taken steps towards ensuring compliance with the norm. 
 
Table 13: Multi-party Elections and Government Changes in Africa (1989-2000)159 
Country Multi-party 
Elections 
Government 
changes 
after 
elections 
Country Multi-party 
Elections 
Government 
changes after 
elections 
Algeria† 1997  Libya None  
Angola† 1992  Madagascar † 1993,1998 1993, 1996 
Benin †  1991, 1995, 1999 1991, 1996 Malawi †  1994, 1999 1994 
Botswana ‡  1989, 1994, 1999  Mali †  1992, 1997  
Burkina Faso †  1992, 1997  Mauritania †  1992, 1996, 2001  
Burundi None  Mauritius ‡  1991, 1995, 2000 1995, 2000 
Cameroon †  1992, 1997  Morocco ‡  1993, 1997  
Cape Verde †  1991, 1995, 2001 1991, 2001 Mozambique † 1994, 1999  
CAR †  None 1993 Namibia †  1989, 1994, 1999  
Chad †  1997  Niger †  1993, 1995, 1996, 1999  
Comoros None  Nigeria †  1999  
DRC/Zaïre None  Rwanda None  
Rep. of Congo None  Sao Tome/Pr.† 1991,  1994, 1998 1991 
Cote d'Ivoire †  1990, 1996, 2000  Sahrawi n.a.  
Djibouti †  1992, 1997  Senegal ‡  1993, 1998, 2001 2000 
Egypt ‡ 1990, 1995, 2000  Seychelles †  1993, 1998  
Eq.  Guinea †  1993, 1999  Sierra Leone † 1996  
Eritrea None  Somalia None  
Ethiopia †  1995, 2000  South Africa † 1994, 1999  
Gabon †  1991, 1996, 2001  Sudan None  
The Gambia †  1992, 1997  Swaziland None  
Ghana †  1992, 1996, 2000 2000 Tanzania †  1995, 2000  
Guinea †  1995  Togo †  1994, 1999  
Guinea-Bissau † 1994, 1999 2000 Tunisia ‡  1989, 1994, 1999  
Kenya †  1992, 1997  Uganda None  
Lesotho †  1993, 1998  Zambia †  1991, 1996, 2001 1991 
Liberia †  1997  Zimbabwe ‡  1990, 1995, 2000  
Legend:   “Multiparty elections”: For the legislature alone; † Multiparty constitutions adopted 1989-1999  
‡ Multiparty constitutions in place before 1989 
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Whatever the reasons may be, the fact is that a growing number of African states 
have adopted democratic constitutions160 and held multi-party elections in the 
1990s (see Table 13), some of which have been “reasonably free and fair”. 
Moreover, the continent has even witnessed a number of peaceful government 
changes following such elections, most recently after Kenya’s elections of 27 
December 2002.161 The glass may thus be far from full, but it is certainly not 
completely empty either. 
 
That elections are held and sometimes even bring about government changes 
does not automatically make states free and liberal, as it is entirely conceivable 
that even elected governments may be corrupt and authoritarian and violate the 
civil and political rights of their citizens. True democracy may also presuppose a 
free press, a well-established party system and civil society institutions to ensure 
a free exchange of opinion and public participation. However, because of the 
neopatrimonial structures the state tends to be hard to distinguish from society 
and almost all pervasive, which makes it hard to find authentic civil society 
intuitions that are not tied up with the state.162 
 
If colonialism was the main reason for the political failures of post-colonial 
states one would assume that their political performance would improve over 
time, i.e. the further they progressed from the colonial era. Judging by the 
ratings published annually by the renowned Freedom House, however, there is 
no such discernable trend, but the picture is rather one of slow progress 
alternating with setbacks (See Table 14). 
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Table 4.14:  Political and Civil Liberties  (1972/73 – 2001/02)163  
 1972-73 1982-83 1992-93 2001-02 Trend 
 P C F P C F P C F P C F P C F
Angola n.a. 7 7 NF 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 1 1 0
Benin 7 5 NF 7 6 NF 2 3 F 3 2 F 4 3 ++
Botswana 3 4 PF 2 3 F 1 2 F 2 2 F 1 2 +
Burkina Faso 3 4 PF 6 5 NF 5 5 PF 4 4 PF -1 0 0
Burundi 7 7 NF 6 6 NF 6 5 PF 6 6 NF 1 1 0
Cameroon 6 4 PF 6 6 NF 6 5 NF 6 6 NF 0 -2 -
Cape Verde n.a. 6 6 NF 1 2 F 1 2 F 5 4 ++
CAS 7 7 NF 7 5 NF 6 5 PF 5 5 PF 2 2 +
Chad 6 7 NF 6 7 NF 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 0 1 0
Comoros n.a. 4 5 PF 4 2 PF 6 4 PF -2 1 0
DRC 7 6 NF 6 7 NF 6 5 NF 6 6 NF 1 0 0
ROC 7 7 NF 7 6 NF 3 3 PF 5 4 PF 2 3 +
Cote d'Ivoire 6 6 NF 5 5 PF 6 4 PF 5 4 PF 1 2 +
Djibouti n.a. 5 6 NF 6 6 NF 4 5 PF 1 1 +
Eq. Guinea 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 7 6 NF 6 6 NF 0 0 0
Eritrea n.a. 7 6 NF n..a 
Ethiopia 5 6 NF 7 7 NF 6 4 PF 5 5 PF 0 1 +
Gabon 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 4 4 PF 5 4 PF 1 2 +
The Gambia 2 2 F 3 3 PF 1 2 F 5 5 PF -3 -3 -
Ghana 6 6 NF 6 5 NF 5 5 PF 2 3 F 4 3 ++
Guinea 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 6 5 PF 6 5 NF 1 2 0
Guinea-Bissau n.a. 6 6 NF 6 5 PF 4 5 PF 2 1 +
Kenya 5 4 PF 5 5 PF 4 5 PF 6 5 NF -1 -1 -
Lesotho 7 4 NF 5 5 PF 6 4 PF 4 4 PF 3 0 +
Liberia 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 7 6 NF 6 5 PF 0 1 +
Madagascar 5 3 PF 5 5 PF 4 4 PF 2 4 PF 3 -1 0
Malawi 7 6 NF 6 7 NF 6 7 NF 4 3 PF 3 3 +
Mali 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 2 3 F 2 3 F 5 3 ++
Mauritania 6 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 5 5 PF 1 1 +
Mauritius 3 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 1 2 F 2 0 0
Mozambique n.a. 7 7 NF 6 4 PF 3 4 PF 4 3 +
Namibia n.a. 2 2 F 2 3 F -2 -3 0
Niger 6 6 NF 7 6 NF 5 4 PF 4 4 PF 2 2 +
Nigeria 6 4 PF 2 3 F 5 4 PF 4 5 PF 2 -1 0
Rwanda 7 6 NF 6 6 NF 6 5 NF 7 6 NF 0 0 0
Sao Tome/Princ. n.a. 6 6 NF 2 3 F 1 3 F 5 3 ++
Senegal 6 6 NF 4 4 PF 4 3 PF 3 4 PF 3 2 +
Seychelles n.a. 6 6 NF 6 4 PF 3 3 PF 3 3 +
Sierra Leone 4 5 PF 5 5 PF 7 6 NF 4 5 PF 0 0 0
Somalia 7 6 NF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 6 7 NF 1 -1 0
South Africa 5 6 NF 5 6 NF 5 4 PF 1 2 F 4 4 ++
Sudan 6 6 NF 5 5 PF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF -1 -1 0
Swaziland 4 2 PF 5 5 PF 6 5 PF 6 5 NF -2 -3 -
Tanzania 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 6 5 PF 4 4 PF 2 2 +
Togo 7 5 NF 7 6 NF 6 5 NF 5 5 PF 2 0 +
Uganda 7 7 NF 5 5 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 PF 1 2 +
Zambia 5 5 PF 5 6 PF 2 3 F 5 4 PF 0 1 0
Zimbabwe 6 5 NF 3 5 PF 5 4 PF 6 6 NF 0 -1 0
Legend: P: Political freedom, C: Civil liberties, both ranked from 1 (best) to 7 (worst) 
F:  Freedom, ranked NF: no freedom, PF: partial freedom and F: free; Trend: 
Development in “freedom” since first decade of independence, ranked : -: 
deterioration, 0: no change  +: improvement (from NF to PF or from PF to F),  ++: 
improvement from NF to F) 
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Security Sector Deficiencies 
An important—indeed arguably the central—component of the state is the 
“security sector”, i.e. those institution which are tasked with upholding order 
within as well as protecting the state and its citizens against threats from 
without. 
 
In Europe and the rest of the West (or North) war and the preparations for war 
have been the exclusive domain of the state at least since the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648), just as the state has enjoyed a weberian “monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force” within its sovereign domain, while the international 
arena has remained anarchic. By implication, the external and internal aspects of 
security (i.e. national defence and domestic order, respectively) have been 
clearly separated, but both have been prerogatives of the state, represented by 
the army, the police and the judiciary. While these boundaries may be gradually 
eroding in the developed and increasingly “post-modern” North,164 they have 
never been clearly demarcated in Africa, where non-state agents have all along 
played significant roles as set out in Table 15.  
 
Table 15: The 
Security Sector External security Internal security Other functions 
Europe 
Mission National defence Domestic Order 
 
Rescue etc. 
State agencies Army, Navy, Air Force 
Intelligence service(s) 
Police  
Internal intelligence service(s)  
Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Police  
Non-state 
agencies 
None PSC (Relatively few and 
insignificant) 
Private companies 
Africa 
Mission National defence Counter-
insurgency
Domestic order Rescue etc. 
Economic 
activities 
Army Police, Army State agencies 
 
Army, Navy, Air Force 
Military and foreign 
intelligence service(s) Internal intelligence service(s) 
Police, Army, 
intelligence 
service(s) 
Non-state 
agencies 
PMC PMC PSC, Vigilante groups PMC, PSC 
Legend: PMC: Private Military Companies, PSC: Private Security Companies 
 
Here the term “security sector” (or “security structures”) may be a useful generic 
term for the multitude of institutions, which are involved in the field of  
“security” (vide infra), but usually covering such institutions as the army and 
police and their respective intelligence agencies as well as their respective 
functional equivalents in the private sector.165 Examples of how distinctions are 
becoming blurred include the following: 
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• Armies often have domestic security as their primary goal, e.g. in the form of 
counter-insurgency warfare or constabulary duties.166 
• Armies do not merely engage in military activities, but sometimes are also 
domestic economic actors in their own right, occasionally behaving as 
“predators”, as seems to have been the case of the forces operating on 
opposing sides in the war in the DRC (see case study in chapter eight).167 
• A major part of the “policing” tasks are performed not by state agents but by 
either neighbourhood watch groups, vigilante groups or (for those who can 
afford it) private security companies.168 
• Mercenary companies such as the (now dismantled) Executive Outcomes and 
Sandline have been involved in both domestic and external forms of security, 
e.g. in Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC.169 
 
One of the reasons for the prevalence of private actors is the weakness of the 
state, both with regard to national defence and internal security. In general, 
African armies are quite small and weak, certainly in comparison with their 
European counterparts, and especially in view of the large territories and long 
borders they are supposed to defend against neighbours who are often far from 
confidence-inspiring (see Table 16).  
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Table 16:  Force Densities 170 
Armed Forces (000) Territory Land border Km2/Troops Country Reg. Res. Param. Total  1000 Km2 Km. Regular Total
Km / 
Troops  
Angola 108 .. 10 118 1,247 5,198 11.6 10.61 0.044
Benin 5 .. 3 7 113 1,989 23.5 15.43 0.272
Botswana 9 .. 1 10 600 4,013 66.7 60.04 0.401
Burkina Faso 7 .. 5 11 274 3,192 40.3 24.27 0.282
Burundi 40 .. 6 46 28 974 0.70 0.61 0.021
Cameroon 13 .. 9 22 475 4,591 36.29 21.51 0.208
Cape Verde 1 .. 0 1 4 0 3.67 3.36 0.000
Central Af. R. 3 .. 2 5 623 5,203 200.96 115.37 0.964
Chad 30 .. 5 35 1,284 5,968 42.66 37.11 0.172
Congo (Rep. of) 10 .. 5 15 342 5,504 34.20 22.80 0.367
Congo (DRC) 56 .. 37 93 2,345 10,744 41.96 25.25 0.116
Côte d’Ivoire 8 12 7 27 322 3,110 38.39 11.77 0.114
Djibouti 8 .. 4 13 22 508 2.62 1.75 0.040
Eq. Guinea 1 .. 0 2 28 539 21.58 17.53 0.337
Eritrea 200 120 .. 320 121 1,630 0.61 0.38 0.005
Ethiopia 353 .. .. 353 1,127 5,311 3.20 3.20 0.015
Gabon 5 .. 2 7 268 2,551 56.95 39.95 0.381
Gambia 1 .. .. 1 11 740 14.13 14.13 0.925
Ghana 7 .. 1 8 239 2,093 34.08 29.82 0.262
Guinea 10 .. 10 19 246 3,399 25.35 12.74 0.176
Guinea-Bissau 7 .. 2 9 36 724 4.95 3.88 0.078
Kenya 22 .. 5 27 583 3,446 26.25 21.42 0.127
Lesotho 2 .. .. 2 30 909 15.18 15.18 0.455
Liberia 15 .. .. 15 111 1,585 7.42 7.42 0.106
Madagascar 21 .. 8 29 587 0 27.95 20.60 0.000
Malawi 5 .. 1 6 118 2,881 23.70 19.75 0.480
Mali 7 .. 8 15 1,240 7,243 167.57 81.58 0.477
Mauritania 16 .. 5 21 1,031 5,074 65.65 49.79 0.245
Mauritius .. .. 2 2 2 0 n.a. 1.03 0.000
Mozambique 6 .. .. 6 802 4,571 131.41 131.41 0.749
Namibia 9 .. 0 9 825 3,824 91.71 90.71 0.420
Niger 5 .. 5 11 1,267 5,697 239.06 118.41 0.532
Nigeria 77 .. 30 107 924 4,047 12.08 8.67 0.038
Rwanda 70 .. 6 76 26 893 0.38 0.35 0.012
Senegal 9 .. 6 15 196 2,640 20.87 12.74 0.171
Seychelles 0 .. 0 1 0.5 0 2.28 0.91 0.000
Sierra Leone 3 .. 1 4 72 958 23.91 18.88 0.252
Somalia 50 .. .. 50 638 2,366 12.75 12.75 0.047
South Africa 63 87 8 159 1,220 4,750 19.24 7.67 0.030
Sudan 105 .. 15 120 2,506 7,687 23.98 20.97 0.064
Swaziland .. .. .. 0 17 535 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tanzania 34 80 1 115 945 3,402 27.80 8.19 0.029
Togo 7 .. 1 8 57 1,647 8.11 7.28 0.211
Uganda 50 .. 1 51 236 2,698 4.72 4.66 0.053
Zambia 22 .. 1 23 753 5,664 34.84 32.72 0.246
Zimbabwe 40 .. 22 62 390 3,066 9.76 6.32 0.050
Total  1,5120 299 233 2,053 24,333 143,564 16.0 0.5 0.070
For comparison 
USA 1,366 1,212 89 2,666 9,629 12,248 7.1 3.6 0.005
Germany 221 364 .. 585 357 3,618 1.6 0.6 0.006
France 294 419 95 808 547 2,889 1.9 0.7 0.004
Denmark 22 65 .. 87 43 68 2.0 0.5 0.001
Legend: Reg.: Regular armed forces; Res.: Reserves;  Param.: Paramilitary forces 
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The above comparison of military manpower even underestimates the 
deficiencies in terms of military strength and the wide gap between Africa and 
the North, as it takes into account neither the quality of the troops nor of their 
equipment. First of all, military personnel in African armed forces are generally 
poorly educated and trained in comparison with their northern colleagues; and 
the armies are often ethnically very mixed, even in such countries where ethnic 
divisions run deep, making their loyalty to the state somewhat dubious.171 
 
Secondly, these deficiencies in terms of manpower are all the more crippling, as 
African states cannot afford the luxury of replacing men with machines, i.e. of 
making their defence more capital- or weapons-intensive. This is all the more 
impossible, because they have no indigenous arms production but, with the 
exception of South Africa,172 rely almost exclusively on arms imports. During 
the Cold War the major arms producers had strategic reasons to furnace African 
states with weapons for free or at discounted prices,173 but this is not longer the 
case. As a result arms acquisitions by African states have become an even 
greater burden on the national economies—to say nothing of the actual arms 
embargoes, which have, over the last five years, been imposed on several 
African states.174 While slowly rising, the import of major weapons systems by 
African states thus remains minuscule compared with most of the rest of the 
world (See Table 17). 
 
1990 US$m Table 17:  Arms Imports 175 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Sub-Saharan Africa 310 196 259 122 256 387 669 668 437 425
North Africa 76 126 306 431 212 209 118 496 299 382
North America 537 721 1,031 514 473 649 139 143 517 584
Central and South America 546 521 836 887 1,050 1,472 823 883 814 1,240
Asia and Oceania 5,567 6,070 5,694 8,178 8,188 11,423 9,035 9,906 5,660 7,436
Europe 6,325 5,175 4,462 3,013 3,409 3,802 4,570 3,988 3,710 3,976
Middle East 6,843 9,031 6,426 6,109 6,699 6,888 7,916 5,079 3,680 2,156
World 20,204 21,840 19,014 19,254 20,287 24,830 23,270 21,163 15,117 16,199
Sub-Saharan African share 
(%) 1.53 0.90 1.36 0.63 1.26 1.56 2.87 3.16 2.89 2.62
 
African armies are therefore poorly armed and equipped, as shown in Table 18, 
which even underestimates the deficiencies, as it does not measure quality. 
 
Each African soldier is thus much more poorly armed and equipped, and as a 
consequence probably capable of covering much less border or territory than 
European or American troops—a problem which is even more serious because 
of the more demanding terrain and lack of adequate infrastructure that usually 
characterise Africa.  
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Table 18:  Major Weapons Systems  in Africa176 
Country MBT APC Art. Ac. Hel.Country MBT APC Art. Ac. Hel.
Angola 400 570 404 140 40Mali 33 50 20 16 0
Benin 0 0 16 0 0Mauritania 35 0 75 7 0
Botswana 0 30 18 30 0Mauritius 0 0 0 0 0
Burk. Faso 0 13 14 5 0Mozambique 80 275 136 0 4
Burundi 0 29 18 4 0Namibia ? 60 24 2 2
Cameroon 0 35 54 15 4Niger 0 22 0 0 0
Cape V. 0 0 24 0 0Nigeria 200 330 458 86 10
CAR 4 39 0 0 0Rwanda 12 50 35 5 0
Chad 60 103 5 2 2Senegal 0 28 18 8 0
ROC 40 68 ? 12 0Seychelles 0 0 0 0 0
DRC 60 ? 100 4 6Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 6
Côte ’Ivoire 0 29 4 5 0Somalia ? ? ? ? ?
Djibouti 0 12 6 0 0South Africa 168 2,833 190 86 7
Eq.Guinea 0 10 0 0 0Sudan 200 343 460 35 10
Eritrea 100 50 100 17 ?Swaziland ? ? ? ? ?
Ethiopia 300 200 312 51 26Tanzania 45 60 265 19 0
Gabon 0 12 4 10 5Togo 2 54 10 16 0
The Gambia 0 0 0 0 0Uganda 140 64 225 10 2
Ghana 0 50 6 19 0Zambia 30 13 96 71 12
Guinea 30 40 26 8 0Zimbabwe 40 330 30 52 32
Guinea-B. 10 55 26 3 0Total 2,067 5,949 3,267 779 202
Kenya 78 62 48 29 34For comparison 
Lesotho 0 0 2 0 0USA 8,023 22,110 6,763 6,008 554
Liberia 0 0 0 0 0Germany 2,521 4,776 2,073 434 204
Madag. 0 30 29 12 0France 809 4,499 794 473 262
Malawi 0 0 9 0 0Denmark 238 296 475 68 12
Legend: MBT: Main battle tanks; APC: Armoured personnel carriers; Art: Artillery; Ac.: Combat 
aircraft; Hel.: Armed helicopters 
 
The Spectre of Praetorianism  
The praetorianism which has haunted large parts of Africa may be seen as a 
reflection of all of the above The term itself simply signifies that the armed 
forces habitually meddle in politics,177 in some cases by usurping power directly 
through a military coup d’état of which Africa has seen plenty (see Table 19).  
Indeed, the first half of 2003 saw two coups, the first one (15-16 March) in the 
Central African Republic (CAR) and the second one in Sao Tome and Principe 
(16 July).178 In other cases, however, the praetorians prefer to remain “in the 
wings”, while defining the borders of permissible political action for the civilian 
politicians, e.g. by means of the implicit threat of a military coup. 179 
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Table 19: Military Coups and other Unconstiutional Political Changes in Africa (-2000)180 
Country Years  Country Years 
Algeria 1965, 1992 Libya 1969 
Angola None Madagascar 1972 
Benin 1963, 1965(a-b), 1967, 1969, 1972 Malawi None 
Botswana None Mali 1968, 1991 
Burkina Faso 1966, 1974, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1987 Mauritania 1978, 1980, 1984 
Burundi 1966a-b, 1976, 1987, 1996 Mauritius None 
Cameroon None Morocco None 
Cape Verde None Mozambique None 
Central Afr. R. 1966, 1979, 1981 Namibia None 
Chad 1975, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1990 Niger 1974, 1996, 1999 
Comoros 1975, 1978, 1989, 1995, 1999 Nigeria 1966a-b, 1975, 1983, 1985, 1993 
DRC/Zaïre 1965, 1997 Rwanda 1973, 1994 
Rep. Of Congo 1963, 1968, 1977, 1979, 1997 Sao Tome/Pt. 1995 
Cote d'Ivoire 1999 Sahrawi n.a. 
Djibouti None Senegal None 
Egypt 1952, 1954 Seychelles 1977 
Eq. Guinea 1979 Sierra Leone 1967, 1968, 1992, 1996, 1997 
Eritrea None Somalia 1969, 1991 
Ethiopia 1974, 1977, 1991 South Africa None 
Gabon 1964 Sudan 1958, 1964, 1969, 1985, 1989 
The Gambia 1994 Swaziland None 
Ghana 1966, 1972, 1978, 1979, 1981 Tanzania None 
Guinea 1984 Togo 1963, 1967 
Guinea-Bissau 1980, 1989, 1999 Tunisia None 
Kenya None Uganda 1971, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1986 
Lesotho 1986, 1991, 1994 Zambia None 
Liberia 1980, 1990 Zimbabwe None 
Legend:   Boldface: Military deposes civilian government; Italics: Contested categorisation as 
“military coup”; Regular: Other unconstitutional changes, including “intra-military coups” 
 
For analytical purposes it may make sense to distinguish between two different 
forms of praetorianism: 
 
Sometimes the military simply represent one neopatrimonial patron-client 
network among others, albeit usually with more ample resources, which simply 
wants its share of society’s wealth. Such kleptocratic or “predatory praetorians” 
rarely relinquish power voluntarily, for obvious reasons. The Doe regime in 
Liberia may be a case in point,181 but this form of praetorianism also shares 
many features with the kind of warlordism to which we shall return shortly, the 
main difference being whether to rule an entire country, or merely parts thereof, 
by military means and for personal gain. 
 
In other cases the armed forces view themselves as “guardians of the nation” or 
of the state, as implied by their professional ethos. They may thus accept, as a 
matter of principle the norm of civilian supremacy, but nevertheless intervene in 
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politics in order to “save” the state, for instance from corrupt politicians, in 
which case they only assume power as a temporary measure. Upon the 
restoration of “order”, they willingly step down in favour of duly elected and (in 
their view) “responsible” politicians, thus revealing themselves as what might be 
called “patriotic praetorians”. An example of this “watchdog model”, as it has 
aptly been labelled by Peter Schraeder,182 may be Nigeria. It may thus be 
similar, in this respect, to the armed forces of Pakistan or Turkey.183 
 
Needless to say, however, the dividing line between the two varieties is neither 
clear-cut nor insurmountable. It is perfectly conceivable that military rulers who 
initially took over for “patriotic” reasons simply acquire a taste for power and 
allow themselves to be corrupted, in which case they tend to show little 
enthusiasm for relinquishing power—as seems to have been the case of some of 
the Nigerian military rulers such as Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93) and Sani 
Abacha (1993-98).184   
 
Even if they are formally civilian, several African governments also rest on the 
foundation of armed force, as their present rulers have come to power by 
winning either a civil war or an armed anti-colonial struggle, as is the case of, 
e.g. Uganda, Zimbabwe and Eritrea. In such cases, the guerilla leader-turned-
civilian politician often retains much of the former military or guerilla ethos, and 
former comrades-in-arms are frequently rewarded with government posts for 
which they are not always suited.185     
 
State Failures 
While state weakness is thus endemic to Africa, most states have managed to 
“muddle through” from crisis to crisis without actual collapse. 
 
In some cases, however, weaknesses have been transformed into vicious circles 
and violent conflicts, which have eventually made the state collapse 
completely.186 This was the fate, at least temporarily, of Somalia, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Congo/Zaïre,187 which are similar, in many respects, to failed states 
in other parts of the world such as Afghanistan.188 In many cases, actual control 
over a failed state’s territory is taken over by warlords or guerilla groups, 
leaving the formal government in control of, at best, the capital and its 
immediate surroundings, as has been the case in many protracted civil wars, e.g. 
in Liberia, Angola and the Congo.189 
 
In a few cases such state collapse has prompted an international de-recognition 
of the state in question, or at least its formal government, leaving it as a curious 
terra nullius in the international system, as has been the case of Somalia, where 
the TNG (Transitional National Government) remains unrecognised by most 
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other states.190  More often the international community has turned the blind eye 
to state failure. This has left the failed state in question as a “quasi-state”, where 
the state remains as almost an empty shell, enjoying “formal sovereignty” 
unaccompanied by any “empirical sovereignty”.191 It is thus recognised as a 
sovereign state, and thereby legally protected against interference by other 
states, or even the United Nations, by the norm of “non-interference in internal 
affairs” (codified, inter alia, in the UN Charter’s article 2.7), but without having 
any actual control over what happens within its sovereign domain.192 
 
We also encounter the opposite phenomenon of functioning polities such as 
Somaliland, established on the territory of former British Somaliland after the 
collapse of Somalia and, to some extent, Puntland in the southern part of 
Somalia, neither of which is internationally recognised even though both would 
qualify as “de facto states”.193 Paradoxically, Africa thus features both states 
recognised as such, even though they have lost all actual elements of statehood, 
and polities, which are not, even though they come closer than many states to 
functioning as such. 
 
The African Security Predicament 
“Security” is an “essentially contested concept”, and it is a matter of political 
controversy which issues to “securitise”, i.e. elevate from the realm of ordinary 
political issues to one where emergency measures can be discussed with 
reference to the fact that a security problem is urgent and “existential”.194 
 
In the developed countries, the concept of security is thus being gradually 
expanded from a narrow one, focusing on international (and mainly military) 
threats to national security to also include other threats to the security of the 
state, i.e. its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The focus may also be 
expanded to include additional “referents” of security such as nations and other 
human collectives—but the expansion has been piecemeal and a matter of some 
controversy. In Africa as well as most other parts of the Third World, however, 
the “traditional” security discourse may all along have been out of touch with 
reality.   
 
National or Regime Security? 
In view of the military weakness of virtually all African countries, it may seem 
paradoxical that only few of them face any  “traditional” military threats to their 
national security from their neighbours. 
 
Even though their “fences” are typically quite low and/or broken, and their 
neighbours often quite nasty, the latter are in most cases too weak in terms of 
offensive military power to launch an attack.195 While some of them may be 
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quite fearsome, or at least uncomfortably unpredictable, in terms of intensions, 
their military capabilities in most cases do not provide them with the means to 
attack their neighbours. While quite a few African states may be able to 
undertake small-scale incursions into the territory of neighbouring states, none 
are really in a position to launch (much less sustain and successfully complete) 
large-scale cross-border offensives, because of their lack of the means of power 
projection, both with regard to weapons systems and logistics. 
 
This becomes obvious from a comparison between African states and selected 
northern great and small powers in terms of their holdings of those types of 
equipment that were singled out in the CFE negotiations in Europe of the late 
1980s as critical for “surprise attack and large-scale offensive action”. Table 
4.16 above thus shows the United States to have about four times as many main 
battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers, twice as much artillery, almost 
eight times as many combat aircraft and around four times as many armed 
helicopters as all of sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, even a small and relatively 
peaceful European country such as Denmark, has more “CFE-type” weapon 
systems that most African states, even such as are, by orders of magnitude, 
larger. 
 
The comparison even underestimates the discrepancies by not taking qualitative 
factors into account. While most of the African tanks, for instance, are obsolete 
Soviet tanks (e.g. T-54s or even T-32s), the holdings of Germany consist almost 
entirely of Leopard-1 and 2 and those of the USA of Abrams-1 tanks, both of 
which are much more capable. Moreover, while most of the equipment of the 
powers of the North is combat-ready (as that which is not is usually “moth-
balled” or destroyed), a very large proportion of the equipment of the African 
armed forces is, at best, suitable for parades, but quite inadequate for actual 
combat.  
 
Even the continent’s great powers, South Africa and Nigeria, thus have far fewer 
and less capable tanks or other armoured vehicles and much fewer aircraft than 
even minor European powers. Their recent experience with military 
interventions seems to confirm the assessment that their offensive strength is 
quite limited.  Even though they were virtually unopposed by regular military 
forces, neither the Nigerian interventions (under the auspices of a multilateral 
ECOWAS force) in Liberia or Sierra Leone nor the South African intervention 
in Lesotho were thus particularly successful. 196 The main weaknesses may be in 
the field of logistics, where few states have the capacity to supply their armies 
over long distances, in turn severely hampering mobility. While this defect 
affects both the offence and the defence, it is most severe for the former, and 
few African states have air forces (or air arms) or navies which could make up 
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for the deficiencies in terms of ground forces.197 
 
Arguably, Sub-Saharan Africa may thus constitute a “zone of defensiveness” 
almost by default, as very few countries would be able to attack others, even if 
unopposed. Certain states may be able to launch small-scale incursions into the 
territory of their immediate neighbours—as in the combined Rwandan and 
Ugandan intervention in the DRC198—but none is able to defeat others 
decisively, much less to “consummate” victory through occupation. What 
neighbouring countries (or others) often do is, however, to support insurgents 
either actively or passively, e.g. by allowing them to use their territory as a 
staging area for cross-border attack. This has, for instance, long been the case of 
Sudan and Uganda, the latter allowing the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army) to operate out of Uganda and the former supporting Ugandan rebel 
movements such as the LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army).199 Needless to say, such 
“transnational conflicts” can undermine national security to at least the same 
extent as ordinary interventions or invasions.200 
 
National security, i.e. the absence of threat to the state as such, is often conflated 
with regime security, i.e. the absence of threats to an incumbent (and often 
illegitimate) regime.201 In actual fact, however, some regimes may not at all 
serve as guardians of the security of their citizens, but may even represent the 
most serious threat to this very security, e.g. when they are responsible for 
genocide, as in Rwanda in 1994. In such cases, national security may even be 
counterproductive (seen from the vantage point of citizens), as it would be 
tantamount to the ability of a genocidal regime to defend itself against attempts 
by other states to halt a genocide in progress by means of a humanitarian 
intervention.202      
 
Societal Security 
Societal security refers to a society’s (as opposed to state’s) or another human 
collective’s “ability (...) to persist in its essential character under changing 
conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the 
sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns 
of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and 
custom”.203 
 
Thus conceived societal security is thus a matter of “identity” which may indeed 
by threatened. However, appeals to protect societal security (i.e. the securitisation 
of identity) may also be tantamount to the construction of groups or individuals as 
threats, combined with an implicit legitimation of “extraordinary measures”. 
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Table 20: Persons under UNHCR Mandate as of 1st Jan 2002204 
Region Refugees Asylum 
seekers
Returned 
refugees
IDPs & al. TOTAL
Asia 5,770,300 33,100 49,200 2,968,000 8,820,700
Africa 3,305,100 107,200 266,800 494,500 4,173,500
Europe 2,227,900 335,400 146,500 2,145,600 4,855,400
Northern America 645,100 441,700 — — 1,086,800
Latin America/Caribbean 37,400 7,900 200 720,000 765,400
Oceania  65,400 15,600 — 300 81,300
TOTAL  12,051,100 940,800 462,700 6,328,400 19,783,100
 
It may thus be abused for xenophobia, fascism or even genocide, as happened 
during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where the instigators appealed to Hutu 
identity and unity in the face of an alleged threat from the Tutsi “cockroaches”, 
e.g. in the infamous “Hutu Ten Commandments”.205 A xenophobic or even racist 
discourse about societal security may also be linked to the phenomenon of 
migration,206 both voluntary and enforced as in refugee flows, of which Africa has 
an abundance (see Table 20).  
 
Not only are the total numbers thus very high in Africa, but the continent also 
hosts some of the very most affected countries, i.e. both countries whence large 
numbers of people flee and (mostly neighbouring) countries hosting them. 
Somewhat paradoxically, several countries find themselves in both roles (see 
Table 21). 
 
Table 21: “Top Ten” Refugee Countries207 
Country of Origin Main Countries of Asylum Total 
Afghanistan Pakistan / Iran 3,809,600 
Burundi Tanzania 554,000 
Iraq Iran 530,100 
Sudan Uganda/Ethiopia /DRC/Kenya/CAR 489,500 
Angola Zambia/DRC /Namibia 470,600 
Somalia Kenya/Ethiopia/ Yemen /USA/United Kingdom 439,900 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Yugoslavia/USA/Sweden /'Denmark /Netherlands 426,000 
DRC Tanzania/Congo/Zambia/Rwanda/Burundi 392,100 
Viet Nam China /USA 353,200 
Eritrea Sudan 333,100 
 
Such problems may be deliberately exploited by unscrupulous leaders seeking to 
place the blame for economic and social problems on “foreigners”—as has, for 
instance, been the case in both Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, South Africa.208 
To the extent that this leads to violent strife between ethnic and/or religious or 
cultural groups it certainly constitutes a serious societal security problem, where 
one group's security spells insecurity for the others. This is a genuine “societal 
security dilemma”, which may even have such abhorrent manifestations as ethnic 
cleansing or even genocide.209 
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Even though societal security as a concept has almost exclusively focused on 
national and ethnic collectives, it supposedly applies to any human collective. One 
might thus also envision cleavages among other societal groupings, which might 
eventually come to be securitised, a first step in which direction would surely be 
political organisation. Religion has already been extensively politicised, if only 
because of its close links to some forms of nationalism.210 When nations are thus 
defined in religious terms (as, for instance, in Pakistan, Iran and, indirectly, Israel) 
“alien” religions risk being viewed as threats to national cohesion and therefore 
securitised. Even when nations or states are not defined in religious terms, the 
politisation of any religion (even the “national” one) may likewise come to be seen 
as threat, as when Sudan introduced Sharia law, or when parts of Nigeria did the 
same.211 The reasons for the “Miss World riots” in Nigeria in 2002, featuring three 
days of killing over a seemingly trivial issue such as the holding of the Miss World 
contest, could arguably be traced back to the introduction of sharia in the locations 
affected two years earlier.212  
 
Such developments have obvious human security implications, if only because it is 
regulated in several human rights conventions. Articles 2 and 18 of the 1948 
human rights convention thus makes clear that 
 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (Art. 2) 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance. (Art. 18) 
 
Human Security 
Human security is basically a matter of human well-being and, in the last analysis, 
survival of people, regardless of their national or other affiliations.213 
 
Even though the state was presumably “created” for the sake of its citizens' 
security, it can also constitute a threat to their security, as mentioned above. On the 
other hand, the main security problem in today's Africa may not be an excess, but 
rather a deficit of state power, as in the failed states described above. In failed and 
weak states, ordinary crime and intercommunal strife may become so prevalent 
that security simply becomes “privatised”. When and where the state cannot 
ensure law and order, people tend to take matters into their own hands. In order to 
protect themselves, their families and their property, they will resort to self-help, 
e.g. by arming themselves, or by enlisting the services of private security 
companies—as we have seen in a country such as South Africa.214 This tends to 
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gradually produce a vicious circle where violence spurs a proliferation of small 
arms, in its turn producing more violence, etc. 
 
Direct violence (in the terminology of Johan Galtung) is not, however, the only 
threat to human security, as various forms of  “structural violence”215 may produce 
even larger numbers of casualties and even greater human suffering, e.g. in the 
form of poverty, malnutrition, decease, loss of human dignity, etc.  In order to 
make any analytical sense of this rather “fuzzy” and vague term, however, we 
have to break it down into sub-categories. 
 
• Non-violent, but nevertheless “intentional” threats to human security, for which 
the state is to blame, i.e. the broad category of human rights violations, of 
which Africa has seen more than its fair share., as has been documented, inter 
alia, in the annual Human Development Reports of the UNDP, or in the reports 
of NGOs such as Human Right Watch or Amnesty International.216 
• Structural violence perpetrated by one societal group against another, as by the 
white minority against the black and coloured majority in South Africa under 
apartheid, or the widespread enslavement of blacks by Arabs in Sudan.217 The 
general oppression of women by men would fall into the same category, even 
though it is, alas, all too often also combined with direct physical violence, 
including rape.218  
• Structural violence caused by the global order, e.g. by “imperialism”, “centre-
periphery relations” or globalisation, responsible for the relative deprivation of 
the peoples of the Third World (vide supra). 
• Threats from “nature”, some of which may surely be exacerbated, but which 
are not caused by, societal and/or political factors, as is the case of 
HIV/AIDS.219  
 
Whether any of these forms of structural violence should be securitised, i.e. treated 
as human security issues, is a matter of political choice and controversy, but it 
probably does little to enhance the analytical rigour of security studies to include 
the fourth type, which is basically a matter of man's struggle with nature. 
 
Environmental Security 
This man/nature relationship is also at the heart of the debate about 
“environmental security”.  That the environment is degrading was discovered 
several years ago. However, the awareness of ecological challenges was especially 
boosted by the publication in 1987 of the report of the Brundtland Commission on 
Our Common Future, which inspired a flood of books on “environmental” or 
“ecologic security”.220 However, to recognise environmental decay as a problem 
was, of course, one thing, to elevate it to the status of a security problem 
something else, which remains disputed. 
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Environmental issues might become subsumed under an expanded notion of 
security, either as a cause or as consequences. First of all, environmental problems 
could be caused by war, or preparations for war.221 Examples from Africa include 
exacerbated deforestation in war-torn southern Sudan, especially the Darfur 
region, and aggravated poaching and some deforestation in Mozambique during 
the civil war.222 
 
Secondly, wars might accrue from environmental problems, e.g. in the form of 
resource wars.223 An obvious example might be wars over scarce water supplies, 
say between states sharing the same river, as is, for instance, the case of the Nile. 
Other conflicts over shared resources in Africa might include poaching (or other 
forms of over-exploitation) of wildlife, fishing or logging.224 Moreover, excessive 
exploitation of natural resources may uproot communities, thus making them (and 
especially their youth) more inclined to join rebel movements, as may have been 
the case in Sierra Leone.225 Paradoxically, what might otherwise be accepted as 
responsible use of nature’s resources (perhaps especially wildlife) may become the 
target of fanatical environmentalist campaigns in the industrialised world, thereby 
representing a threat to the livelihood and, by implication, human security of 
indigenous peoples, as has arguably been the case in Zimbabwe.226    
 
The Pitfalls of Expansion 
Quite a lot can thus be said in favour of adopting a conception of security for 
Africa which differs significantly from that which appears relevant for Europe, 
with a distinctly greater emphasis on human security and a lesser one on 
national security. On the other hand, two caveats may be worth taking seriously.  
 
First of all, the security sector mentioned above is likely to regard security, 
however conceived, as its business. Hence, to expand the concept will also 
enlarge the field of action for the security services, thereby militating against a 
reduction of them. Secondly, as a distinguishing feature of security problems is 
that they justify extraordinary measures, the labelling of political problems as 
security problems may allow the regime to justify repression.  
 
Conflict Motives, Objectives and Behaviour 
What was above labelled “background factors” only impact on African conflicts 
indirectly, i.e. by being translated into motives, objectives and behaviour of the 
various actors, the topic to which this section is devoted.  
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Statehood Conflicts, Ideology and Power Struggles 
Because of the “state pathologies” described above, a number of conflicts have 
revolved around the state, either its very identity or the control of the state 
apparatus.  
 
In some cases the very identity (“idea” in the terminology of Barry Buzan) of 
the state has been an issue, as parts of a state’s population have denied the state 
their loyalty—what might be called a “statehood conflict.” In some cases, this 
has translated into a political, and largely non-violent, struggle for moderate 
claims for regional or provincial autonomy, e.g. within a federal structure, as has 
been the objective of the SPLF (Sudan People’s Liberation Front) in southern 
Sudan— at least according to its own rhetoric. In other cases, (leaders of) 
nations feeling “entrapped” in a larger, multinational, state have attempted 
secession, usually by violent means, as has been the case of Katanga and Biafra 
(vide supra) and as it remains the case of the Cabinda liberation movement 
FLEC (Frente da libertação do enclave de Cabinda), seeking independence 
from Angola, even though “renegades” have recently sought to strike a 
compromise with the government in Luanda.227 Considering the imposed nature 
of its borders, Africa has arguably seen surprisingly few such attempted 
secessions, all of which have been quelled, with the exception of Eritrea.228  
 
The distinction between the two varieties is less clear than one might expect, 
however, as a political struggle sometimes escalates, not only in terms of means, 
but also of ends. If political demands for autonomy are not met, and even more 
so if they are forcefully suppressed, an initially political movement often resorts 
to armed struggle, which the incumbent government almost always seeks to 
forcefully repress. The longer this armed struggle last, and the more intense it 
becomes, the less likely it must appear to the conflicting sides that they will ever 
be able to co-exist peacefully within the same state—hence a demand for 
autonomy easily evolves into one for secession. Even if an agreement on 
autonomy is reached (as between the SPLM and the Sudanese government) 
mutual suspicions are likely to run very deep indeed. The government is likely 
to suspect (perhaps rightly) the SPLM of only accepting autonomy as a tactical 
move and a first step towards secession, and the SPLM is likely (for very good 
reasons) to by sceptical about Khartoum’s willingness to abide by the 
agreement.229 
 
Even though statehood conflicts such as the above have revolved around 
territorial issues, the bone of contention has not simply been territory. Indeed, 
the motive of territorial expansion so well-known from other parts of the world, 
has been conspicuous by its almost complete absence from African conflicts, the 
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only partial examples being the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia and 
the recent war between the former and Eritrea.230 Moreover, neither of these has 
been about territory pure and simple, but rather about territory containing ethnic 
kin, thereby revealing the conflict as one of ethnicity.  In other cases, conflict 
has erupted over land as a reservoir of riches, thereby revealing the conflict as 
one of “greed” (vide infra). That “traditional” territorial disputes have been so 
rare in Africa may be explicable by the relatively ample space available on the 
continent—a historical fact which Jeffrey Herbst has also highlighted as an 
explanation for the weakness of African states, who have neither been forced to, 
nor able to, establish territorial control.231 
 
In most African conflicts, neither the identity nor the borders of the state have 
been questioned by the contending sides, both or all of whom have merely 
wanted at least a share of state power. Most of Africa’s numerous military coups 
(vide supra) fall into this category as do a number of guerilla struggles and 
violent uprisings such as the recent ones (2002/03) in Liberia and Cote 
d’Ivoire.232 Some of these power struggles have been legitimised in terms of 
ideology, but in most cases this seems to have been mainly a matter of power. 
Because of the neopatrimonial nature of most African states, control of the state 
apparatus allows the incumbent rulers to substitute their own clientilistic 
network for that of their predecessors, just as it provides ample access to the 
country’s wealth, perhaps especially so in extractive states (vide supra).  
 
In some conflicts, however, at least some of the conflicting sides have been 
driven by real visions and ideologies. Most prominent have been Marxism and 
especially Maoism which have all along had a considerable appeal in Africa, 
even though some movements’ claims to be Marxist may also have been 
motivated by the hope for Soviet, Chinese or Cuban assistance. Some do, on the 
other hand, appear authentic, especially those which have combined Marxism 
with nationalism and anti-colonialism as, for instance, that of Amilcar Cabral of 
the PAIGC (Partido africano da independência da Guiné e do Cabo Verde).233 
 
Other movements have been driven by liberal values such as democracy, as has 
been the case of the ANC (African National Congress) in South Africa, its ties 
to the Communist Party notwithstanding, as well as perhaps the EPDRF 
(Ethiopian People’s Democratic and Revolutionary Front) in Ethiopia.234  Still 
others have been religiously fundamentalist, either Christian as the Holy Spirit 
Movement and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda (who are, ironically, 
among the most ferocious movements in all of Africa) or some of the Islamist 
groups operating in Ethiopia and elsewhere such as the Al-Ittihad al-Islamia 
(Islamic Union Party), often labelled as terrorists.235  In some cases traditional 
religion has been instrumentalised by rebel leaders as means to boost the morale 
 51
of the fighters, as in the Zimbabwean Chimurenga and in the Liberian civil 
war.236  
 
Ethnic and Security Dilemma Conflicts 
In view of the fact that most African states are multinational it should come as 
no surprise that the ethnic factor has loomed large.237  
 
However much some African scholars and politicians may resent the term 
ethnicity almost as much as that of tribalism, and granting that ethnic identities 
are sometimes not “authentically African”, but partly the results of colonial 
policies of privileging certain ethnic groups over others,238 it remains a fact that 
many conflicts at least appear in an ethnic guise. Even if we disregard the 
primordialist in favour of the social constructivist view of ethnicity as 
“imagined”, it may well be a fact, albeit a social rather than a physical one—but 
no less durable for that, and maintained through shared myths of origin, 
common customs, etc.239  
 
Moreover, the aforementioned economic and state pathologies may well 
facilitate the politisation of ethnic identities, as belonging to a certain ethnic 
group is often the admission ticket into the informal clientilistic networks upon 
which neopatrimonialism rests—and the very fact of extreme economic scarcity 
and rampant unemployment may make belonging to these networks a matter of 
life or death. Furthermore, once ethnic identities are politicised and fought over, 
this very struggle serves to cement ethnic identification, as it gives rise to enemy 
images, militates against inter-marriages or even socialising across ethnic 
divides, etc. Its conflict-proneness and other unappealing manifestations 
notwithstanding, there is thus nothing “irrational” or primitive about ethnicity as 
such, but it is merely one of those features shared by Africans with the peoples 
of other parts of the world, including Europe.240    
 
Ethnicity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of conflict, however, and 
Africa has both experienced violent conflicts in ethnically homogenous states 
(e.g. Somalia) and relative peace in multiethnic states such as Kenya or 
Botswana.241 In some cases, ethnic groups are open for new-comers, e.g. 
through inter-marriage, as has arguably been the case of the (for long periods 
ruling) Amharas in Ethiopia,242 which makes ethnicity a less obvious rallying 
point for political conflicts. In other cases, ethnicity is more solid, e.g. if it is 
constructed around race. The apartheid system in South Africa was the 
paramount example of this, but the Sudanese divide between Arabs in the North 
and Africans in the South may also fall into this category.243 
 
In most cases, ethnically infected motives have been fairly moderate, e.g. to be 
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allowed to practice whatever is central to one’s ethnic group—which is 
sometimes resented by the central government, as it tends to weaken national 
cohesiveness and nation-building. In others, ethnic motives have envisioned the 
quest for privileges, entailing the exclusion of members of other ethnic groups.  
In the most extreme cases it has been a matter of getting rid of the other ethnic 
group altogether, either through ethnic cleansing (as with Idi Amin’s expulsion 
of the entire Asian community from Uganda)244 or through genocide as in 
Rwanda or Burundi. 
 
In some cases the struggle is basically seen as one of survival, as when one 
ethnic group’s control of the state constitutes an acute security risks for the 
other(s).245 This has, for instance, been the case in both Rwanda and Burundi, 
where this “ethnic security dilemma” has resulted in genocide. That there is no 
strong correlation between the “stickiness” of ethnicity and the intensity of the 
ensuing conflict becomes obvious from the fact that Ethiopia has experienced 
more than its fair share of ethnic conflicts, between the central government and 
rebel movements which are ethnically defined as, e.g., Afar, Oromo, Sidama. 
Tigrayan or Somali;246 and that Burundi and Rwanda with even more “fluid” 
forms of ethnicity have seen the most atrocious ethnic genocides of the entire 
continent.247  
 
Greed and Survival Conflicts 
In several cases economic factors have been paramount, as highlighted in 
several recent studies on “the political economy of civil wars”.248 Even though 
violent conflicts are usually ostensibly fought for other ends, closer analysis has 
often uncovered a quest for enrichment (“greed”) at the heart of them. However, 
greed appears at different levels and has different manifestations as well as 
consequences. As far as the level of analysis is concerned, it makes sense to 
distinguish between the rank-and-file and the leaders making the big decisions 
about war or peace, i.e. between the motives and dynamics of  “bottom-up” and 
“top-down” violence, respectively.249 
 
As far as leaders are concerned, the simplest manifestation of greed is, of course, 
the quest for something valuable, e.g. the control of state power or pieces of 
territory containing oil fields, diamond mines or whatever. In this case the use of 
armed force is merely an indirect means to achieving (partial or complete) 
victory, the spoils of which is control. This is the usual picture of “resource 
wars”.250 In other cases, the very act of violence becomes almost an end in itself 
as it provides a favourable climate for all sorts of clandestine economic activities 
such as smuggling, drug trafficking, etc.—just as it makes the “protection” 
which armed forces can provide worth paying for, even though they may the 
ones causing the violence in the first place. As argued by David Keen,  
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Conflict can create war economies (...). Under these circumstances, ending civil wars becomes 
difficult. Winning may not be desirable: the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy which it 
confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes.251   
 
The phenomenon of warlordism falls under the same heading, as warlords thrive 
in such a violent environment, where their “protection” is needed by the civilian 
population, whereas they would lose control if the struggle were to come to an 
end—even with their own victory.252 
 
The two causal paths from greed to profits via the use of armed force are 
illustrated in Fig. 2 Needless to say, they are not mutually exclusive, as it is 
entirely possible that leaders strive for victory as in path A whilst at the same 
time trying to reap profits from the war economy via path B. 
 
 
     Path A    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
     Path B 
 
 
 
 
 
Path A may best explain (the economic aspects of) the civil war in Angola, 
which could be seen as being waged for control of oil and diamond-rich territory 
by the incumbent MPLA government and the rebel UNITA movement, 
respectively-—or the civil war in southern Sudan where the government in 
Khartoum is seeking to establish control over SPLM-controlled areas and evict 
the population for the sake of oil exploration.253 More or less clear-cut cases of 
Path B may be the various conflicts in the Mano River region (e.g. Liberia and 
Sierra Leone),254 and that in the DRC between the state and rival rebel groups as 
well as their respective foreign patrons.255   
 
Economic motives also play a role far the agents, as opposed to leaders and 
decision-makers. As far as the private military companies are concerned, the 
term greed may be entirely appropriate, as they are obviously in their business 
for the profits (as all other businesses)—and they would obviously be run out of 
business by any lasting peace. This does not, however, preclude their having an 
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Fig. 4.2: Economic 
Motives for Violence  
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interest in helping bring about a particular peace, as Executive Outcomes did in 
Sierre Leone,256 as such an accomplishment may gain them future clients 
elsewhere. 
 
As far as the fighters themselves are concerned war is often more a matter of 
survival than of reaping handsome profits to spend on luxuries. Many of 
Africa’s combatants, both those who are on the payroll of governments and 
those who have been recruited by the various rebel movements, have few 
prospects of finding a livelihood in civilian life, as they have no other vocational 
skills than those of soldiering and usually have been uprooted from their (village 
or other) communities.  Hence their propensity to “live off the land” by 
plundering the civilian population, and their unfortunate tendency to seek other 
armed professions, such as those as security guards, mercenaries or criminals, 
upon their demobilisation following the signing of a peace—or to simply go on 
fighting, say by joining a splinter movement refusing to demobilise, thus 
perpetuating the war. Hence also the need, now increasingly acknowledged by 
the international community, of providing assistance for DDR&R 
(demobilisation, disarmament, repatriation and reintegration) programmes (vide 
supra). 
 
The Pattern of Conflicts 
Compared to most other parts of the world, which are at peace and characterised 
by more or less radical disarmament, Africa remains fraught with violent 
conflict, and wars as well as the preparations for and long-term consequences of 
war continue to exact a heavy toll on already fragile economies and societies. 
However, even though Africa has definitely been conflict-ridden, the pattern of 
its conflicts differs significantly from those of other continents, as virtually all 
conflicts have been intrastate or transnational, whereas the number of genuine 
international conflicts has been quite low.  
 
Ever since the dawn of independence in the 1960s, sub-Saharan Africa has seen 
very few regular wars between states (see Table 22), and only the Ogaden War 
between Ethiopia and Somalia and that between Ethiopia and Eritrea were on a 
major scale. 
 
Table 22: International wars in Africa257 
1983 
1977-78 
1985 
1987) 
1989-90 
1996 
1998-2000 
Chad/Nigeria 
Ethiopia/Somalia 
Burkina Faso/Mali 
Chad/Libya 
Mauritania/Senegal 
Cameroon/Nigeria 
Ethiopia/Eritrea 
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To these international wars should, of course, be added a number of 
interventions (the distinction between the two admittedly being rather fuzzy), 
most prominently those undertaken by apartheid South Africa in Angola and 
Mozambique, the latter preceded by an intervention by the Ian Smith regime of 
“Rhodesia”.258. Other examples include the intervention by Tanzania in Uganda 
in 1978, which was also undertaken by regular forces,259 and the intervention by 
several states in the civil war in the DRC since 1997 (vide supra) with an 
estimated death toll of more than three million, mostly civilians.260 
 
Most of Africa’s wars have, however, been intra-state, i.e. civil wars, as 
becomes apparent from Table 23, which is based on a data-set jointly developed 
by Nordic peace research institutes. Africa has seen no less than seventeen civil 
wars and other major armed intrastate conflicts—counting each conflict only 
once, even though several of them have been cyclical.261  
 
A striking feature of the list in Table 23 is how relatively few conflicts have 
been over territory, compared to Europe. Another striking feature is how many 
of these conflicts have involved several conflicting parties, often forming 
transient and opportunistic alliances, making the binary view of conflicts so 
often encountered obviously inadequate. What also emerges from the table is 
how many countries have been affected by wars and other violent conflicts over 
time, as clarified in Table 4.24, which even underestimates the problem, by 
counting countries with several simultaneous conflicts only once. 
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Table 23 : Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa262 
Location Period Type Side A Side B Disp. ter. 
1960-65, 
1966-74 
Decol. Portugal MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, Cuba, South 
Africa, Zaire 
Angola 
1975-89 Ext. inv. Angola, Cuba UNITA , South Africa, FNLA , Zaire - 
1990-94, 
1995, 1998-99 
Intra Angola UNITA - 
1992, 1994, 
1996-97 
Intra Angola FLEC Cabinda 
Angola 
 
2000-01 Ext. inv. Angola, Namibia UNITA - 
Burkina 
Faso 
1987 Intra Burkina Faso Popular Front - 
Burkina 
Faso – 
Mali 
1985 Internat. Burkina Faso Mali Agacher Strip 
1965 Intra Burundi Military faction - Burundi 
1990-92, 
1995-96, 
1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000-01 
Intra Burundi Ubumwé, Palipehutu, CNDD, Frolina, 
CNDD-FDD 
- 
1957-60 Decol. France UPC Cameroon Camero. 
1984 Intra Cameroon Military faction - 
Camer. 
– 
Nigeria 
1996 Internat. Cameroon Nigeria Bakassi 
Central 
Afr. R. 
2001 Ext. inv. Central African 
Republic, Libya 
Military faction - 
1965-88 Ext. inv. Chad Various groups, Libya - 
1989, 1990 Ext. inv. Chad Military faction , MOSANAT, Islamic 
Legion, Libya 
- 
Chad 
 
1991-94, 
1997-01 
Intra Chad MDD (-FANT), CSNPD, CNR, FNT, 
FARF, MDJT 
- 
Chad – 
Libya 
1987 Internat. Chad Libya Aozou strip 
Chad – 
Nigeria 
1983 Internat. Chad Nigeria Lake Chad 
Como-
ros 
1997 Intra Comoros MPA Anjouan 
1960-62 Intra Congo/Zaire Katanga Katanga 
1960-62 Intra Congo/Zaire Independent Mining State of South Kasai South Kasai 
1964-65 Intra Congo/Zaire CNL - 
1967 Intra Congo/Zaire Opposition militias - 
1977, 1978 Intra Congo/Zaire FLNC - 
1996, 1997 Ext. inv. Congo/Zaire AFDL, Rwanda, Angola - 
Congo/ 
Zaire 
1998-99, 
2000, 2001 
Ext. inv. Congo/Zaire, 
Zimbabwe, Angola, 
Namibia, Chad 
RCD, RCD faction, MLC, Rwanda, 
Uganda 
- 
1997 Ext. inv. Congo-Brazzaville FDU, Angola - Congo- 
Brazza-
ville 
1998-99 Ext. inv. Congo-Brazzaville, 
Angola 
Opposition militias - 
Djibouti 1991-94 Intra Djibouti FRUD  
Eq. 
Guin. 
1979 Intra Equatorial Guinea Military faction - 
Eritrea – 
Ethiopia 
1998-00 Internat. Eritrea Ethiopia Badme 
Ethiopia 1960 Intra Ethiopia Military faction - 
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1962-67, 
1968-73, 
1974-91 
Intra Ethiopia ELF , ELF factions, EPLF Eritrea 
1975-76, 
1977-78, 
1979-83 
Ext. inv. Ethiopia, Cuba WSLF Ogaden 
1976-91 Intra Ethiopia EPRP, TPLF , EPDM,  OLF - 
1989-91 Intra Ethiopia ALF Afar 
1996, 1998-01 Intra Ethiopia ONLF Ogaden 
1996 Intra Ethiopia ARDUF Afar 
1996-97, 1999 Intra Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami Somali 
1999-01 Intra Ethiopia OLF Oromiya 
Ethiopia 
– 
Somalia 
1960, 1964, 
1973, 1983, 
1987 
Internat. Ethiopia Somalia Ogaden 
Gabon 1964 Ext. inv. Gabon, France Military faction - 
Gambia 1981 Intra Gambia SRLP - 
Ghana 1966, 1981, 
1983 
Intra Ghana Military faction - 
Guinea 1970, 2000-01 Intra Guinea Military faction - 
1963-64, 
1965-73 
Decol. Portugal PAIGC Guinea-Bissau Guinea-
Bissau 
1998, 1999 Ext. inv. Guinea-Bissau, 
Senegal, Guinea 
Military faction - 
1952, 1953-56 Decol. United Kingdom Mau Mau Kenya Kenya 
1982 Intra Kenya Military faction - 
Lesotho 1998 Intra Lesotho Military faction - 
1980 Intra Liberia Military faction - 
1989, 1992, 
1993-95 
Intra Liberia NPFL, INPFL - 
1990, 1991 Ext. inv. Liberia NPFL, Burkina Faso, INPFL - 
1996 Intra Liberia Ulimo-J - 
Liberia 
2000-01 Intra Liberia LURD - 
Madagas
-car 
1971 Intra Madagascar Monima National Independence 
Movement 
- 
1990 Intra Mali MPA Air and 
Azawad 
Mali 
1994 Intra Mali FIAA Air and 
Azawad 
Mauri-
tania 
1957-58 Decol. France, Spain National Liberation Army Morocco/ 
Mauritania 
Maurit- 
Senegal 
1989-90 Internat. Mauritania Senegal Common 
border 
1964-65, 
1966-71, 
1972-73, 1974 
Decol. Portugal Frelimo Mozamb. Mozam-
bique 
1976-80, 
1981-92 
Intra Mozambique Renamo - 
1990-92 Intra Niger FLAA Air and 
Azawad 
1994 Intra Niger CRA Air and 
Azawad 
1996 Intra Niger FDR Toubou 
1997 Intra Niger UFRA Air and 
Azawad 
Niger 
1997 Intra Niger FARS Toubou 
1966 Intra Nigeria Military faction - Nigeria 
1967-70 Intra Nigeria Republic of Biafra Biafra 
 58
Rhode-
sia 
1972-75, 
1976-79 
Intra Rhodesia ZANU , ZAPU - 
1990, 1991-
92, 1993-94 
Intra Rwanda FPR - Rwanda 
1998, 1999-
00, 2001 
Intra Rwanda Opposition alliance - 
Senegal 1990, 1992-
93, 1995, 
1997-01 
Intra Senegal MFDC Casamance 
1991-93, 
1994-97, 
1998-99 
Intra Sierra Leone RUF, AFRC, ECOMOG, Kamajors - Sierra 
Leone 
2000 Ext. inv. Sierra Leone, 
United Kingdom 
RUF, AFRC, ECOMOG, Kamajors - 
1978 Intra Somalia Military faction - 
1981-86, 
1987-88 
Intra Somalia SSDF , SNM, SPM - 
Somalia 
1989-92, 
1993-96 
Intra Somalia SNM , Military faction , SSDF , USC, 
USC faction 
- 
1966-78, 
1979, 1980-
83, 1984-85, 
1986-88 
Intra South Africa SWAPO Namibia South 
Africa 
1981-88, 
1989-93 
Intra South Africa ANC, PAC, Azapo - 
1963-72 Intra Sudan Anya Nya Southern Sudan
1970 Intra Sudan Sudanese Communist Party - 
1976 Intra Sudan Islamic Charter Front - 
1983-92 Intra Sudan SPLM Southerrn 
Sudan 
Sudan 
1993-94, 
1995-2001 
Intra Sudan SPLM, Faction of SPLM, NDA Southern Sudan
1986 Intra Togo MTD - Togo 
1991 Intra Togo Military faction - 
Trini-
dad 
1990 Intra Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Jamaat al-Muslimeen - 
1971, 1977 Intra Uganda Military faction - 
1972 Intra Uganda UPA - 
1978, 1979 Ext. inv. Uganda, Libya UNLA , Tanzania - 
1981-88 Intra Uganda NRA, UFM, UPM, UNRF, UFDM, UPF, 
UPDA, UPC, UNLA, FOBA, HSM 
- 
1989, 1990, 
1991 
Intra Uganda Faction of UPDA, UPA, HSM, UDCM, 
UPDCA 
- 
Uganda 
1994-95, 
1996-2001 
Intra Uganda LRA, WNBF, ADF - 
Legend:   
(In column for period) 
Normal: Minor conflit, i.e.  more than 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period; Italics: Intermediate conflict, i.e. more than 
25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle-related deaths; Boldface: War, i.e. more than 1000 battle-
related deaths per year for every year in the period 
(In column for type) 
Decol.: Decolonisation conflict, in the dataset labelled “Extra-state”, i.e. “conflicts over a territory between a government and one or more
opposition groups, where the territory is a colony of the government.”; Internat. : International conflict, in the dateset labelled “Interstate”, i.e. 
“conflicts between two or more countries and governments”; Intra: Intra-state conflict, in the dataset labelled  “Internal”, i.e. “conflicts within a 
country between a government and one or more opposition groups, with no interference from other countries”; Ext. Inv.: External involvement 
in intra-state conflict, in the dateset labelled “Internatized internal”, i.e. “similar to internal conflict, but where the government, the opposition
or both sides receive support from other governments”; Disp. ter.: Territory in dispute 
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Acronyms: 
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Forces Revolutionary Council; ALF: Afar Liberation Front; ANC: African National Congress; ARDUF: Afar Revolutionary Democratic 
Unity Front; CNDD: Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie; CNDD-FDD: Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-
Forces pour la défense de la démocratie; CNL: Conseil national de libération; CNR: Comité national de redressement; CRA: Coordination 
of the Armed Resistance; CSNPD: Conseil de salut national pour la paix et la démocratie; ECOMOG: Economic Organization of West 
African States Monitoring Group; ELF: Eritrean Liberation Front; EPDM: Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement; EPLF: Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front; EPRP: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party; FARF: Forces armées pour la République fédérale; FARS: 
Forces révolutionnaires du Sahara; FDR: Front démocratique pour le renouveau; FDU: Forces démocratiques unies; FIAA: Front islamique 
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togolaise pour la démocratie; NDA: National Democratic Alliance; NPFL: National Patriotic Forces of Liberia; NRA: National Resistance 
Army; OLF: Oromo Liberation Front; ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front; PAC: Pan Africanist Congress; PAIGC: Partido africano 
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moçambicana; RUF: Revolutionary United Front; SNM:  Somali National Movement; SPLM: Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement; 
SPM: Somali Patriotic Movement; SRLP: Socialist and Revolutionary Labour Party; SSDF: Somali Salvation Democratic Front;SWAPO: 
South West Africa People’s Organization; TPLF: Tigrean People’s Liberation Front; UDCM: United Democratic Christian Movement; 
UFDM: Ugandan Federal Democratic Movement; UFM: Uganda Freedom Movement; UFRA: Union des forces de la résistance armée; 
ULIMO-J: United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia; UNITA: União nacional para a indepen-dência total de Angola; UNLA: 
Uganda National Liberation Army; UNRF: Uganda National Rescue Front; UPA: Uganda People’s Army; UPC: Uganda People’s Congress; 
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Table 4.24: Armed Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by Year, 1960-2001263 
Year War  Intermediate Minor 
1960     Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Zaire 
1961    Angola, Zaire 
1962    Angola, Ethiopia, Zaire 
1963 Sudan    Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Zaire 
1964 Sudan,  Zaire    Angola, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique, Somalia 
1965 Chad, Sudan, Zaire Guinea-Bissau  Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique 
1966 Chad, Sudan Angola,  Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique 
Ethiopia. Ghana, Nigeria, South 
Africa 
1967 Chad, Nigeria, Sudan Angola, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique 
Ethiopia, South Africa, Zaire 
1968 Chad, Nigeria, Sudan Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique 
South Africa 
1969 Chad, Nigeria, Sudan Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique 
South Africa 
1970 Chad, Nigeria, Sudan Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique 
Guinea, South Africa 
1971 Chad, Sudan Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique  
Madagascar, South Africa, Uganda
1972 Chad, Mozambique, Sudan Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau  
Rhodesia, South Africa, Uganda 
1973 Chad, Mozambique Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau Rhodesia, South Africa, Somalia 
1974 Chad, Ethiopia Angola, Mozambique Rhodesia, South Africa 
1975 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia   Rhodesia, South Africa 
1976 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Rhodesia 
  Mozambique, South Africa, Sudan 
1977 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Rhodesia 
 Mozambique, South Africa, 
Uganda, Zaire 
 60
1978 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Rhodesia 
Zaire  Mozambique, South Africa, 
Somalia, Uganda 
1979 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Rhodesia, Uganda 
South Africa  Equatoria Guinea, Mozambique 
1980 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, South 
Africa 
 Liberia, Mozambique 
1981 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique,  South Africa 
 Gambia, Ghana, Somalia, Uganda 
1982 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique,  South Africa 
 Kenya, Somalia, Uganda 
1983 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, South Africa, 
Sudan 
 Ghana, Somalia, Uganda 
1984 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Sudan 
South Africa Cameroun, Somalia, Uganda 
1985 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Sudan 
South Africa  Burkina Fasu, Somalia, Uganda 
1986 Angola, Chad, Sudan, 
Mozambique, Ethiopia,  South 
Africa 
 Somalia, Togo, Uganda 
1987 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, South Africa, 
Sudan 
Somalia  Burkina Fasu, Uganda 
1988 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, South Africa, 
Sudan 
Somalia Uganda 
1989 Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda 
Chad  Liberia, Mauritania  
1990 Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, 
Mozambique, South Africa, 
Somalia, Sudan 
Uganda  Burundi, Mali, Mauritania ,Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal 
1991 Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, 
Sudan, Uganda 
Liberia Burundi, Chad, Djbouti, Niger, 
Sierra Leone, Togo 
1992 Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, 
Sudan 
  Chad, Djbouti, Niger, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone 
1993 Angola Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia Chad, Djbouti, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan 
1994 Angola Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia  
Chad, Djbouti, Mali, Niger, Sudan, 
Uganda 
1995 Sudan Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia  
Burundi, Senegal, Uganda 
1996 Sudan Angola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Uganda  
Burundi, Cameroun, Ethiopia, 
Liberia, Niger, Zaire 
1997 DRC, ROC, Sudan Angola, Burundi, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Uganda 
Chad, Comoros, Ethiopia, Niger 
1998 Angola, Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, 
Guinea-Bissau, ROC, Rwa, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan 
Senegal, Uganda Chad, Eritrea, Lesotho 
1999 Angola, DRC, Ethiopia, ROC, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan 
Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda 
Chad, Eritrea 
2000 Angola, Burundi, DRC, Sudan Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda  
Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Liberia 
2001 Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, SudanDRC, Uganda CAR, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone 
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Legend: War, i.e. more than 1000 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period; Intermediate conflict, i.e. more 
than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle-related deaths; Minor conflit, i.e.  
more than 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period. 
   
Summary 
We have thus seen that Africa features not only a large number, but also a broad 
variety of conflicts, at least some of which can be traced back to background 
factors such as economic or political “pathologies”. We have also seen that 
African countries are faced with very real security problems, both in terms of 
national, societal and human security.  
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